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INTRODUCTION 
“This employee is being terminated due to violation of company policy. The 
employee is gay.”1 
 
This was the reason Cracker Barrel stated for dismissing Cheryl Sum-
merville, a cook for the restaurant chain, on her official separation notice.2 
Cracker Barrel fired as many as sixteen employees pursuant to a company 
policy, promulgated in January 1991, stating that it was “inconsistent with 
[Cracker Barrel’s] concept and values and . . . with those of [its] customer 
base, to continue to employ individuals . . . whose sexual preferences fail to 
demonstrate normal heterosexual values which have been the foundation of 
families in our society.”3 In the face of criticism and a boycott by various 
groups, namely, the Atlanta chapter of Queer Nation, the Company rescinded 
its policy; however, at the time of the statement, the fired employees had not 
been rehired.4 Concerned about the impact of the adverse public reaction on 
Cracker Barrel’s sales, the New York City Comptroller’s and Finance 
Commissioner’s offices, as trustees of several of the city’s pension funds that 
collectively owned about $3 million of Cracker Barrel stock, submitted a 
shareholder proposal on behalf of the New York City Employees’ Retire-
ment System, requesting that the company formally prohibit discrimination 
based on sexual orientation.5 In a no-action letter, “the [SEC] not only 
agreed that the proposal could be excluded” from the company’s proxy 
materials but also outlined a new standard—the “Cracker Barrel Standard”—
which dictated that employment-based shareholder proposals would “always be 
excludable by corporations,” even if they implicated “significant social policy 
issues.”6 The 1992 Cracker Barrel shareholder proposal was the first of its kind 
 
1 John Howard, The Cracker Barrel Restaurants, in CAROL HARVEY & M. JUNE ALLARD, 
UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING DIVERSITY 187, 188 (5th ed. 2011). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 See id. at 188 (“We have re-visited our thinking on the subject and feel it only makes good 
business sense to continue to employ those folks who will provide the quality service our 
customers have come to expect.”). 
5 Id. at 189-90; Joseph A. Roy, Non-Traditional Activism: Using Shareholder Proposals to Urge 
LGBT Nondiscrimination Protection, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1513, 1523-24 (2009). 
6 Roy, supra note 5, at 1524. 
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to raise the issue of LGBT employment protections7—after the SEC’s no-
action letter, it could have been the last. However, almost twenty years after 
the SEC’s decision, the use of shareholder proposals to garner workplace 
protections for LGBT individuals has been extraordinarily successful. 
This Comment explores the use of shareholder proposals for implementing 
reforms of corporate nondiscrimination policies as they affect LGBT 
employees. It argues that, particularly in the absence of comprehensive 
statutory employment protections for LGBT individuals, shareholder 
proposals have been an extremely effective tool for activists and interested 
shareholders to effect employment protections for LGBT employees. 
Part I provides background on the extent of LGBT workplace discrimina-
tion and solutions promulgated to address the problem, including statutory 
measures and corporate nondiscrimination policies. Part II explains the 
history and use of shareholder proposals to garner LGBT employment 
protections. Part III describes the shareholder proposals filed between 2005 
and 2012 that sought to either add or remove LGBT employment protec-
tions. Lastly, Part IV outlines the arguments typically used by shareholder-
proponents of proposals seeking to add or remove LGBT employment 
protections and the SEC’s historical treatment of such proposals. 
I. LGBT WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
A. Prevalence of LGBT Workplace Discrimination 
LGBT individuals have faced a long and pervasive history of discrimina-
tion in society, particularly in the workplace. A 2012 study consolidating the 
findings of surveys, experiments, courts, administrative agencies, and 
legislatures on LGBT employment discrimination found the following: 
• “As recently as 2008, the General Social Survey found that of the nationally 
representative sample of LG people, 37 percent had experienced workplace 
harassment in the last five years, and 12 percent had lost a job because 
of their sexual orientation;”8 
• “As recently as 2011, 90 percent of respondents to the largest survey of 
transgender people to date reported having experienced harassment or 
mistreatment at work, or had taken actions to avoid it, and 47 percent 
 
7 Id. at 1523. 
8 Jennifer C. Pizer et al., Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination Against 
LGBT People: The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination and Providing for Equal 
Employment Benefits, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 721 (2012). 
  
2014] Shareholder Proposals After Cracker Barrel 933 
 
reported having been discriminated against in hiring, promotion, or job 
retention because of their gender identity;”9 
• Numerous reports of employment discrimination against LGBT people 
have been found in court cases, state and local administrative complaints, 
complaints to community-based organizations, academic journals, news-
papers and other media, and books;10 and 
• Discrimination and harassment in the workplace can have a negative impact 
on the wages and mental and physical health of LGBT people.11 
B. Statutory Solutions to LGBT Workplace Discrimination 
1. Federal Approaches 
Despite the prevalence of LGBT workplace discrimination, efforts to 
develop a federal statutory approach have been largely unavailing. There is 
currently no federal statute explicitly prohibiting employment discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation or gender identity.12 Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination based on “race, 
color, religion, sex, and national origin.”13 Since the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins that established gender stereotyping 
as actionable sex discrimination under Title VII,14 some lower federal courts 
have begun to extend this holding to offer Title VII protections to LGBT 
individuals.15 However, such an interpretation has not been uniform among 
the federal circuits.16 
“[F]ederal legislators have [unsuccessfully] sought to enact explicit pro-
tections for lesbian and gay workers consistently since 1973, introducing bills 
 
9 Id. 
10 Id.; see also, e.g., id. at 731 (“In 2002, the U.S. Government Accountability Office compiled 
a record of 4,788 state administrative complaints alleging employment discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation or gender identity filed between 1993 and 2001.”). 
11 Id. at 721; see also, e.g., id. at 737-38 (“Transgender respondents to a 2011 national survey 
were unemployed at twice the rate of the general population, and 15 percent reported a household 
income of under $10,000 per year.”). 
12 Id. at 742. 
13 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2006). 
14 See 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“[W]hen a plaintiff in a Title VII case 
proves that her gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may 
avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have 
made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff ’s gender into account.”). 
15 Pizer et al., supra note 8, at 746-47. 
16 Cf. id. (“Indeed, this sound principle [acknowledging the relationship between gender 
identity / sexual orientation and gender discrimination] now governs in at least five circuits.”). 
  
934 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 929 
 
in [nearly] every Congress since 1994.”17 The current version of the pro-
posed Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013 (ENDA),18 which was 
first introduced in 1994, would extend current federal employment protec-
tions to individuals on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, 
with exceptions for religious organizations and small businesses (those with 
fewer than fifteen employees).19 In 2007, a version of the bill, which only 
offered protections for sexual orientation, passed in the House but failed in 
the Senate.20 The current version of the bill, which includes protections for 
transgender individuals, passed in the Senate on November 7, 2013, and, at 
the time of publication, is under review by the House Subcommittee on 
Workforce Protections.21 
2. State and Local Approaches 
Despite the absence of comprehensive federal protections, many state 
and local governments have passed laws offering employment protections to 
LGBT employees in their jurisdictions. As of June 2013, seventeen states 
and the District of Columbia prohibited discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity, and four states prohibited employment 
discrimination based on sexual orientation alone.22 As of 2012, of the states 
that did not offer statutory protection for both sexual orientation and 
gender identity, eleven had gubernatorial executive orders that “prohibit[ed] 
discrimination on either or both bases against state employees,” though 
these executive orders “provide[d] limited enforcement opportunities and 
 
17 Id. at 760-61. 
18 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, H.R. 1755, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 815, 113th 
Cong. (2013); Employment Non-Discrimination Act, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/ 
laws-and-legislation/federal-legislation/employment-non-discrimination-act (last visited Feb. 21, 2014) 
(providing basic information about EDNA, such as its purpose and limitations). 
19 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act, supra note 18. 
20 Julie Bolcer, With Senate Hearing, Hope for a Jumpstart on ENDA, ADVOCATE.COM (June 
12, 2012), http://www.advocate.com/politics/2012/06/12/senate-hearing-hope-jumpstart-enda. 
21 Bill Summary & Status 113th Cong. (2013–2014) S. 815, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: THOMAS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d113:s.815: (last visited Feb. 21, 2014); Bill Summary & Status 
113th Cong. (2013–2014) H.R. 1755, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d113:h.r.1755: (last visited Feb. 21, 2014); see also Ben de Guzman, Red-Letter Day, 
HUFFPOST: GAY VOICES (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ben-de-guzman/red-
letter-day_b_4256707.html. 
22 State Nondiscrimination Laws in the U.S., NATIONAL GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue_maps/non_discrimination_6_13_color.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (showing a color-coded map of the United States that displays states 
that ban sexual orientation discrimination and those that ban both sexual orientation and gender 
identity discrimination). 
  
2014] Shareholder Proposals After Cracker Barrel 935 
 
lack[ed] permanency.”23 In addition to statewide employment protections, 
by 2012, at least 200 cities and counties prohibited employment discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation, gender identity, or both.24 
State and local laws, however, are limited in their ability to fully protect 
LGBT employees. First, local resource and capacity constraints may limit 
enforcement of such laws.25 Second, state and local laws have also been 
highly vulnerable to repeal.26 For example, “[i]n 2011, the Tennessee legisla-
ture passed a law prohibiting local governments from adopting broader 
antidiscrimination ordinances or policies than provided for by state law.”27 
This law, in turn, overturned a Nashville ordinance prohibiting discrimina-
tion by city contractors on the basis of sexual orientation.28 
C. Corporate Nondiscrimination Policies 
Despite the patchwork statutory protections for LGBT employees, cor-
porations are increasingly amending their nondiscrimination policies to 
include sexual orientation, gender identity, or both. Between 2002 and 2013, 
the percentage of Fortune 500 companies with sexual orientation and gender 
identity nondiscrimination policies increased from 61% to 88% and 3% to 57%, 
respectively.29 In fact, 2013 was the first year in which “a majority of the 
Fortune 500 [companies] include[d] both sexual orientation and gender 
identity protections.”30 An increasing number of companies are also institut-
ing other LGBT-friendly employment policies—for example, in 2013, 62% 
of Fortune 500 companies offered domestic partner health benefits.31 
 
 
 
23 Pizer et al., supra note 8, at 756. 
24 Id. at 757. 
25 Id. (“Several academic studies demonstrate that state and local administrative agencies 
often lack the resources, knowledge, enforcement mechanisms, or willingness to accept and 
investigate sexual orientation and/or gender identity discrimination complaints.”). 
26 Id. at 758-59 (“From 1974 to 2009, over 120 ballot measures sought to repeal or prevent 
laws against sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination. Half of these measures passed.”). 
27 Id. at 759. 
28 Id. 
29 See infra Table 1. 
30 See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2013, at 6 
(2013), available at http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/CorporateEqualityIndex_2013.pdf. 
31 See infra Table 2. 
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Table 1: Percentage of Companies with Sexual Orientation and  
Gender Identity in Corporate Nondiscrimination  
Policies Among the Fortune 50032 
 2002 2008 2013 
Sexual Orientation in Nondiscrimination Policy 61% 88% 88% 
Gender Identity in Nondiscrimination Policy 3% 25% 57% 
 
Table 2: Percentage of Companies with LGBT-Friendly Employment  
Policies Among the Fortune 50033 
 2013
Sexual Orientation in Nondiscrimination Policy 88%
Gender Identity in Nondiscrimination Policy 57%
Domestic Partner Health Benefits 62%
Transgender-Inclusive Benefits 25%
Organizational Competency Practices 42%
Public Commitment to the LGBT Community 48%
 
Activists and other interested parties have used several tools to spur 
companies to adopt nondiscrimination policies. Each seeks to align the goals 
of the company’s management with those of interested stakeholders. Three 
such tools are particularly notable. First, employee advocacy groups have 
motivated internal discussions between employees and management about 
employment policies. Second, the Human Rights Campaign’s Corporate 
Equality Index has brought attention to companies’ LGBT employment 
policies and has been an important tool for consumers and prospective 
employees seeking to purchase from or work for an LGBT-friendly company. 
Since 2002, the Human Rights Campaign has published its annual Corpo-
rate Equality Index, which rates companies based on LGBT-friendly 
employment policies.34 Though the index has traditionally focused on the 
presence of sexual orientation and gender identity in companies’ equal 
employment opportunity (EEO) policies, more recent publications have 
covered other practices, such as providing domestic partner and 
transgender-inclusive health benefits, requiring organizational LGBT 
competency (for example, through employee training), and making a “public 
 
32  HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, supra note 30, at 6. 
33 Id. at 9. 
34 See id. at 10, 12. 
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commitment to equality for the LGBT community.”35 Businesses that 
receive a one-hundred percent rating on the Corporate Equality Index are 
named “Best Places to Work for LGBT Equality”—a distinction that may 
help them recruit employees.36 Third, shareholder proposals, the focus of 
this Comment, have been effective at raising shareholders’ concerns regard-
ing LGBT issues. As discussed further in Part II, such proposals allow 
shareholders to publicize these issues in the company’s proxy materials and 
bring them to a shareholder vote. Such proposals have been extraordinarily 
successful at influencing companies to adopt sexual orientation and gender 
identity nondiscrimination policies.37 
II. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS 
A. Shareholder Proposals Generally 
Corporate law has traditionally viewed shareholders as the owners of the 
corporation and viewed the managers and board of directors as their 
agents.38 Shareholders can influence company decisionmaking in a variety of 
ways, including electing directors, voting on extraordinary business matters 
(e.g., mergers, major asset sales, and dissolution), and approving changes to 
the bylaws or articles of incorporation.39 Shareholders can also influence 
corporate decisionmaking through shareholder proposals—resolutions 
advanced by and for the consideration of the shareholders.40 These pro-
posals typically come in two varieties: (1) “[g]overnance proposals[, which] 
focus on traditional management issues such as executive compensation . . . and 
voting requirements” and (2) “[s]ocial proposals[, which] call for reports or 
policy changes on social or environmental issues that can impact a company’s 
bottom line.”41 Though many shareholder proposals are nonbinding,42 and few 
receive a majority shareholder vote, they are nonetheless effective at bringing 
shareholders’ concerns to the attention of management and the public.43 
 
35 Id. at 12. 
36 Id. at 10. 
37 See infra subsection III.B.4. 
38 Adam J. Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, A Prod, and a Big Stick: An Evaluation of 
Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals, and the Ultra Vires Doctrine as Methods for Controlling Corporate 
Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 929, 937 (2005). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Understanding Shareholder Votes, AS YOU SOW: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, 
http://www.asyousow.org/csr/understandingvote.shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
42 Id. 
43 Sulkowski & Greenfield, supra note 38, at 937-38. 
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Shareholder proponents can submit proposals in two different ways. They 
can send the proposals at their own expense to the other shareholders.44 
Alternatively, shareholders can opt to use Rule 14a-8 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, which, if certain criteria are satisfied, requires a 
company to “include a shareholder’s proposal in its proxy statement and 
identify the proposal in its form of proxy when the company holds an 
annual or special meeting of shareholders.”45 Most shareholders opt for the 
latter option, since the former is usually cost-prohibitive.46 
B. Requirements for Submitting a Shareholder Proposal 
There are several requirements for successfully submitting a shareholder 
proposal for inclusion in the company’s proxy materials. First, a shareholder 
must have “continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the 
company’s securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for 
at least one year by the date [he] submit[ted] the proposal.”47 Second, 
“[e]ach shareholder may submit no more than one proposal to a company 
for a particular shareholders’ meeting.”48 Third, “[t]he proposal, including 
any accompanying supporting statement, may not exceed 500 words.”49 
Fourth, the company must receive the proposal by the deadline determined 
in accordance with Rule 14a-8(e).50 Failure to adhere to the requirements 
may result in exclusion of the proposal if the shareholder proponent does 
not remedy any deficiency after being notified by the company.51 Addition-
ally, the company may be permitted to exclude the shareholder proponent’s 
proposal from the proxy materials for the subsequent two calendar years if 
the shareholder proponent or a qualified representative fails, without good 
cause, to appear and present the proposal at the shareholders’ meeting.52 
C. Excluding a Shareholder Proposal from the Proxy Materials 
In addition to procedural exclusion, a company can also exclude a share-
holder proposal on substantive grounds.53 If a company intends to exclude a 
 
44 Roy, supra note 5, at 1517. 
45 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1) (2013); see also Roy, supra note 5, at 1517. 
46 Roy, supra note 5, at 1517. 
47 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1). 
48 Id. § 240.14a-8(c). 
49 Id. § 240.14a-8(d). 
50 Id. § 240.14a-8(e). 
51 Id. § 240.14a-8(f). 
52 Id. § 240.14a-8(h). 
53 See infra Table 3. 
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shareholder proposal, it must file its reasons with the SEC and provide a 
copy to the shareholder proponent no later than eighty days before it files 
its definitive proxy statement with the SEC.54 The company may also seek a 
no-action letter from the SEC.55 The “‘no-action’ process” is an informal 
procedure that enables the company “to obtain the informal views of the 
SEC staff on proposed transactions that appear to raise compliance issues 
under applicable federal securities laws and the rules thereunder.”56 The 
SEC may respond to the company favorably, adversely, or refuse to respond 
on the merits.57 A favorable no-action letter may state that the SEC “will 
not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if [the company] 
omits the proposal from its proxy materials” based on the rule relied upon 
in the company’s request for a no-action letter.58 An adverse no-action letter 
may state that the SEC is “unable to concur in [the company’s] view that [it] 
may exclude the proposal” based on the rule relied upon in the company’s 
request for a no-action letter.59 A reply of “no response on the merits” from 
the SEC may state that “the staff has indicated that legal, policy, or practical 
considerations may make it inappropriate for it to respond on the merits of 
a no-action request.”60 
Part IV discusses the particular substantive grounds that companies have 
tried to use to modify or exclude proposals concerning nondiscrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j). 
55 Thomas P. Lemke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42 BUS. LAW. 1019, 1019 (1987). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1031. 
58 E.g., Alpha Natural Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 36455, at *1 (Mar. 5, 2012). 
59 E.g., Exxon Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 977660, at *1 (Mar. 20, 2012). 
60 See Lemke, supra note 55, at 1033. 
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Table 3: Substantive Grounds for Excluding Shareholder  
Proposals Under Rule 14a-861 
Rule Description
14a-8(i)(1) Improper under state law
14a-8(i)(2) Violation of law
14a-8(i)(3) Violation of proxy rules
14a-8(i)(4) Personal grievance; special interest
14a-8(i)(5) Relevance
14a-8(i)(6) Absence of power or authority
14a-8(i)(7) Management functions
14a-8(i)(8) Director elections
14a-8(i)(9) Conflicts with company’s proposal
14a-8(i)(10) Already substantially implemented
14a-8(i)(11) Duplication
14a-8(i)(12) Resubmissions
14a-8(i)(13) Specific amount of dividends
D. Literature on Shareholder Proposals 
Existing literature on shareholder proposals has focused almost exclu-
sively on the results of shareholder votes in evaluating the efficacy of 
shareholder proposals as a tool for effecting corporate change. This litera-
ture generally reports the following: 
 
• Corporate governance proposals typically receive a greater level of 
shareholder participation than do social policy proposals, which may 
indicate that shareholders believe corporate governance proposals are 
more connected to firm value;62 
 
61 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (2013). 
62 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable 
Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 185-86 (2001) (“[I]n 1994, social 
responsibility proposals rarely received more than 20% of the vote while corporate governance 
proposals at times received 40% . . . . In addition, although no social responsibility proposal has 
ever passed . . . the number of corporate governance proposals obtaining a majority . . . increase[d] 
dramatically in the 1990s . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, 
Shareholder Proposals in the New Millennium: Shareholder Support, Board Response, and Market 
Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 368, 370 (2007) (“[N]umerous studies have differentiated between 
corporate governance proposals, which directly relate to issues affecting shareholder value and receive 
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• The type of shareholder proponent influences shareholder support of 
the proposals. Institutional investors, for example, tend to garner more 
support for their proposals than do individuals or religious organizations;63 
• The precatory nature of shareholder proposals results in only certain 
types of proposals effecting actual change, regardless of the outcome of 
a shareholder vote;64 and 
• Stock ownership by “insiders” (e.g., corporate management and direc-
tors) reduces support for shareholder proposals.65 
 
There is relatively little scholarship that focuses on social policy share-
holder resolutions. In 1999, N.K. Chidambaran and Tracie Woidtke found 
“that a larger percentage of social issue proposals is withdrawn compared to 
corporate governance proposals.”66 In 2006, Paula Tkac analyzed social 
policy resolutions filed between 1999 and 2002 and concluded that with-
drawal of a resolution generally indicates negotiation with management, 
finding that “almost 80 percent [of withdrawn proposals] resulted in a 
concrete corporate response.”67 In 2012, Miguel Rojas identified factors that 
typically increase the chances of withdrawal—for example, (1) certain issues, 
such as equal employment, tend to result in negotiated settlement and (2) 
the percentage of votes received by a resolution in the prior year is positively 
correlated to the likelihood of withdrawal.68 
Despite Rojas’s findings on equal employment proposals generally, there 
has been little academic research on the use of shareholder proposals to 
 
significant shareholder support, and social responsibility proposals, where the connection to firm 
value is more tenuous and which attract low levels of shareholder approval.” (citation omitted)).  
63 See, e.g., Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder 
Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 275, 285, 288 (2000) (“On average, 
proposals sponsored by institutional or coordinated investors receive over 175% as many votes as 
those sponsored by individuals.”). 
64 E.g., Thomas & Cotter, supra note 62, at 371. 
65 See, e.g., Romano, supra note 62, at 185 (“[T]he percentage of votes cast for shareholder 
proposals is negatively related to insider ownership and positively related to institutional 
ownership.”). 
66 N.K. Chidambaran & Tracie Woidtke, The Role of Negotiations in Corporate Governance: 
Evidence from Withdrawn Shareholder-Initiated Proposals 7-8 (NYU Ctr. for Law & Bus., Working 
Paper No. CLB-99-012, 1999). 
67 Paula Tkac, One Proxy at a Time: Pursuing Social Change Through Shareholder Proposals, FED. 
RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV., Third Quarter 2006, at 18-19. 
68 See Miguel Rojas et al., What Explains a Negotiated Outcome for Social Policy Shareholder 
Resolutions?, MGMT. REV.: INT’L J., Summer 2012, at 17, 37-39 (showing positive and significant 
correlations to withdrawal for some, but not all, resolutions addressing social policy issues, and 
resolutions that received broad shareholder support in the past year). 
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implement nondiscrimination policies that include sexual orientation and 
gender identity. Existing research has not quantified the efficacy of share-
holder proposals seeking LGBT-inclusive EEO policies, but rather has 
focused on specific areas of discrimination, such as employee benefits. For 
example, examining case studies of LGBT-inclusive proposals, Nicole 
Raeburn notes that shareholder proposals on such nondiscrimination 
measures as domestic partner–benefits policies can create tangible policy 
changes even without a shareholder vote.69 On the other hand, Danielle 
Dale, focusing solely on the ability of shareholder proposals to initiate a 
shareholder vote on an issue, concludes that the proposals “lack any real teeth 
in regards to amending corporate employment discrimination policies.”70 
This Comment contributes to the existing literature by evaluating the 
content and outcome of shareholder proposals that seek to add, remove, or 
modify LGBT nondiscrimination policies.71 Additionally, it analyzes share-
holder proponents’ and boards of directors’ arguments for or against imple-
menting such proposals.72 Lastly, it examines the SEC’s response to no-action 
letter requests concerning these proposals and shows that the SEC has 
made extensive value judgments on LGBT-exclusive resolutions through a 
line-editing approach that is unique among social policy shareholder pro-
posals.73 This Comment concludes that shareholder proposals have been 
essential in securing workplace protections for members of the LGBT 
community, particularly in lieu of comprehensive statutory protections. 
This Comment is consistent with prior literature on social policy share-
holder resolutions, which suggests that withdrawal of a resolution generally 
indicates a successful settlement and a “concrete corporate response.”74 
However, this Comment goes further in analyzing outcomes by tracking the 
ultimate success of proposals that are not initially adopted. This is im-
portant considering that, though thirty percent of LGBT-inclusive resolu-
tions are initially unsuccessful, sixty-four percent of those failed resolutions 
 
69 NICOLE C. RAEBURN, CHANGING CORPORATE AMERICA FROM INSIDE OUT: LES-
BIAN AND GAY WORKPLACE RIGHTS 132 (2004) (“Employee activists have a far greater chance 
of winning equitable policies when their companies are subject to gay-inclusive nondiscrimination 
statutes, boycotts, lawsuits, or shareholder action.”). 
70 Danielle R. Dale, Note, Gender Identity Protection: The Inadequacy of Shareholder Action to 
Amend Corporate Employment Discrimination Policies, 36 IOWA J. CORP. L. 469, 492 (2011). 
71 See infra Part III. 
72 See infra Part IV. 
73 Id. 
74 Tkac, supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also Rojas et al., supra note 68, at 21-22 
(“[W]e saw the initiation of a shareholder proposal as being part of an ongoing process of 
negotiations between shareholders and management. Only when an agreement cannot be reached 
by the parties, is the proposal put to a vote.”). 
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are ultimately adopted.75 This suggests the importance of sustained share-
holder advocacy at effecting change. Sustained negotiations between 
shareholders and companies as well as publicity raised by shareholder 
proposals could contribute to their success. This Comment also describes 
the SEC’s current stance toward employment-based shareholder proposals. 
In contrast to the Cracker Barrel Standard employed twenty years ago, which 
rendered virtually all employment-based proposals excludable under the 
“ordinary business operations exclusion,”76 such proposals concerning 
nondiscrimination policies are now rarely excluded.77 Today, the ordinary 
business operations exclusion is generally triggered only for LGBT-inclusive 
proposals that espouse broad concepts of nondiscrimination touching such 
areas as marketing and corporate strategy.78 Attempts to exclude LGBT-
exclusive proposals have also been rebuffed by the SEC, primarily through 
line-editing. This may reflect a baseline position that nondiscrimination 
proposals are prima facie includable in companies’ proxy materials, but that 
proxy materials should not be a platform for voicing broad, inflammatory 
social and political judgments. Whether a statement is too inflammatory to be 
included is a case-by-case value judgment without a clear, objective standard. 
III. LGBT-NONDISCRIMINATION-POLICY SHAREHOLDER 
PROPOSALS, 2005–2012 
A. Methodology and Overview of Sample 
To explore shareholder proposals that seek to add or remove sexual ori-
entation or gender identity from companies’ nondiscrimination policies, 
data were compiled from multiple sources to analyze (1) shareholder 
proposals from 2005–2012 and (2) SEC no-action letters from 2000–2012. 
For the purposes of this Comment, shareholder resolutions that seek 
to add sexual orientation, gender identity, or both to a company’s non-
discrimination policy are described as “LGBT-inclusive.” Shareholder 
resolutions that seek to remove sexual orientation or gender identity 
from a company’s nondiscrimination policy are described as “LGBT-
exclusive.” The terms “nondiscrimination policies” and “equal employ-
ment opportunity . . . policies” are used interchangeably. 
 
75 See infra Tables 6 & 7. 
76 Roy, supra note 5, at 1524. 
77 See generally infra Tables 10 & 13. 
78 See Roy, supra note 5, at 1513-14, 1526-27. 
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1. Sources of Shareholder Resolutions 
A database of 248 LGBT-inclusive and LGBT-exclusive shareholder 
proposals, filed between 2005 and 2012, was created using the following 
resources: 
• SEC EDGAR System: The SEC’s EDGAR system collects and main-
tains forms and documents disclosed by public companies and permits 
a full-text search for items disclosed during the past four years.79 
Schedule 14A filings and SEC no-action letters were searched using the 
terms “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” to find pertinent 
shareholder proposals. Filings were individually examined to ensure rele-
vance to this study. The EDGAR system compiles only shareholder pro-
posals that are publicly filed by the company—for example, proposals that 
were withdrawn by the shareholder prior to disclosure in a Schedule 14A 
filing—necessitating the use of voluntary shareholder disclosure to fill in 
the gaps. 
• Proxy Preview: Proxy Preview is an annual report published by As You 
Sow, an organization that “promotes environmental and social corpo-
rate responsibility.”80 The report provides an overview of environmen-
tal and social shareholder resolutions filed in anticipation of the proxy 
season.81 Proxy Preview reports published in the years between 2005 and 
2012 were used to populate the study’s shareholder resolution database.82 
The reports provide information about the shareholder proponent, the 
company, the proposal’s content, and meeting date or status of the pro-
posal (e.g., withdrawn, passed).83 
 
79 Search the Next-Generation EDGAR System, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
80 About As You Sow, AS YOU SOW, http://www.asyousow.org/about (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
81 PROXY PREVIEW, http://www.proxypreview.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2014); see also HEIDI 
WELSH & MICHAEL PASSOFF, AS YOU SOW, PROXY PREVIEW 2012, at 2-5, http://asyousow.org/ 
publications/2012/ProxyPreview2012_20120319.pdf [hereinafter PROXY PREVIEW 2012]. 
82 PROXY PREVIEW 2012, supra note 81; HEIDI WELSH & MICHAEL PASSOFF, AS YOU SOW, PROXY 
PREVIEW 2011, http://www.asyousow.org/publications/ProxyPreview_2011.pdf; MICHAEL PASSOFF, AS YOU 
SOW, PROXY PREVIEW 2010, http://www.asyousow.org/publications/2010%20articles/ProxyPreview2010.pdf; 
HEIDI WELSH & MICHAEL PASSOFF, AS YOU SOW, PROXY PREVIEW 2009, http://www.asyousow.org/ 
publications/ProxyPreview_2009.pdf; HEIDI WELSH & MICHAEL PASSOFF, AS YOU SOW, PROXY 
PREVIEW 2008, http://www.asyousow.org/publications/proxy-preview-2008.pdf; MICHAEL PASSOFF, 
AS YOU SOW, PROXY PREVIEW 2007, http://www.asyousow.org/publications/2007_proxy_preview.pdf; 
MICHAEL PASSOFF, AS YOU SOW, PROXY PREVIEW 2006, http://www.asyousow.org/publications/ 
2006_proxy_preview.pdf; MICHAEL PASSOFF, AS YOU SOW, PROXY PREVIEW 2005, 
http://www.asyousow.org/publications/2005_proxy_preview.pdf. 
83 See, e.g., PROXY PREVIEW 2012, supra note 81, at 27 tbl. 
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• Shareholder-Proponent Publications: Information about shareholder 
resolutions was also compiled from the websites and publications of the 
following shareholder-proponents of resolutions for LGBT-inclusive EEO 
policies84: Calvert Investments,85 the New York City Pension Funds,86 
Pride Foundation,87 Trillium Asset Management,88 the Unitarian Univer-
salist Association of Congregations,89 and Walden Asset Management.90 
 
84  There may be selection bias to the extent that shareholder proponents who report their 
activism activities (and are thus included in the data used in this report) have different results than 
other shareholder proponents. For example, individual shareholders may be underrepresented in 
this dataset, and may have a weaker capacity to influence change with shareholder proposals than 
institutional shareholders. 
85 Sustainable and Responsible Investing: Calvert’s Shareholder Resolutions: Historical Record, 
CALVERT INVESTMENTS, http://www.calvert.com/sri-resolutions-history.html (last visited Feb. 
21, 2014). 
86 NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER, 2012 SHAREOWNER INITIATIVES OF THE NEW 
YORK CITY PENSION FUNDS, available at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/ 
documents/2012-Shareholder-Report.pdf [hereinafter 2012 NYC PENSION FUND POSTSEASON 
REPORT]; NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER, 2011 SHAREOWNER INITIATIVES OF THE NEW 
YORK CITY PENSION FUNDS, available at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/ 
documents/2011-Shareholder-Report.pdf [hereinafter 2011 NYC PENSION FUND POSTSEASON 
REPORT]; COMPTROLLER OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THE 2010 SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL 
PROGRAMS OF THE NEW YORK CITY PENSION FUNDS & RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, available at 
http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/2010-Shareholder-report.pdf [hereinaf-
ter 2010 NYC PENSION FUND POSTSEASON REPORT]; NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER, THE 2009 
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL PROGRAMS OF THE NEW YORK CITY PENSION FUNDS & RETIREMENT 
SYSTEMS, available at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/2009-Shareholder-
report.pdf [hereinafter 2009 NYC PENSION FUND POSTSEASON REPORT]; NEW YORK CITY 
COMPTROLLER, THE 2008 SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL PROGRAMS OF THE NEW YORK CITY 
PENSION FUNDS & RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, available at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/ 
uploads/documents/2008-Shareholder-report.pdf [hereinafter 2008 NYC PENSION FUND POSTSEASON 
REPORT]; NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER, POSTSEASON REPORT: 2007 SHAREHOLDER 
PROPOSAL PROGRAMS & OTHER SHAREOWNERSHIP INITIATIVES OF THE NEW YORK CITY 
PENSION FUNDS & RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, available at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/ 
uploads/documents/2007-Shareholder-report.pdf [hereinafter 2007 NYC PENSION FUND 
POSTSEASON REPORT]; NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER, THE NEW YORK CITY PENSION 
FUNDS’ 2006 SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS, available at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-
content/uploads/documents/2006-shareholder-report.pdf [hereinafter 2006 NYC PENSION FUND 
POSTSEASON REPORT]; NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER, 2005 PROXY INITIATIVES OF 
THE NEW YORK CITY PENSION FUNDS, available at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-
content/uploads/documents/2005-shareholder-report.pdf [hereinafter 2005 NYC PENSION FUND 
POSTSEASON REPORT]. 
87 Shareholder Advocacy, PRIDE FOUND., http://www.pridefoundation.org/what-we-do/initiatives/ 
shareholder-activism (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
88 2011 Resolutions at a Glance, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., http://www.trilliuminvest.com/ 
uncategorized/2011-resolutions-at-a-glance (last visited Feb. 21, 2014); Trillium’s 2010 Shareholder 
Resolutions At-A-Glance, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., http://www.trilliuminvest.com/news-articles-
category/advocacy-news-articles/2010-shareholder-resolutions-at-a-glance (last visited Feb. 21, 2014); 
2009 Shareholder Advocacy At-A-Glance, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., http://www.trilliuminvest.com/ 
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2. Attributes of Shareholder Resolutions 
Data on the shareholder resolutions and the companies for which they 
were filed were compiled from: Schedule 14A filings, Form 8-K and Form 
10-Q filings, the Hoovers database,91 company websites, the Human Rights 
Campaign (HRC) Equality Index,92 and news articles. 
 
Table 4: Attributes of Shareholder Resolutions and Sources 
Attribute Source(s) 
Proxy season year  Schedule 14A Filings 
Content of proposal (LGBT exclusive versus LGBT inclusive) Schedule 14A Filings 
Protections advocated for in shareholder proposal (sexual orientation 
only, gender identity only, both sexual orientation and gender identity) 
Schedule 14A Filings 
Arguments in favor of resolution by the shareholder proponent Schedule 14A Filings 
Arguments in favor against resolution by the board of directors Schedule 14A Filings 
Name of shareholder proponent Schedule 14A Filings 
Results of shareholder votes (percentage of votes in favor of the 
resolution and whether the resolution passed) 
Form 8-K and 10-Q Filings 
Year that sexual orientation or gender identity protections were 
implemented 
Company websites, HRC 
Equality Index, News articles 
3. SEC No-Action Letters 
In addition, SEC no-action letters issued between 2000 and 2012 regarding 
requests by companies to omit LGBT-inclusive or LGBT-exclusive share-
holder resolutions from proxy materials were collected and examined. These 
no-action letters generally contain the entire correspondence among the 
shareholder proponent, the company, and the SEC regarding the omission 
of the shareholder resolution, as well as the final decision by the SEC and 
the statutory basis for that decision. 
 
news-articles-category/advocacy-news-articles/2009-shareholder-advocacy-at-a-glance (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2014). 
89 Shareholder Advocacy, UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST ASS’N OF CONGREGATIONS, 
http://www.uua.org/finance/investment/sri/shareholderadvocacy/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
90 Shareholder Resolution History, WALDEN ASSET MGMT., http://www.waldenassetmgmt.com/ 
investing-for-Change/shareholder_resolution_history (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
91 HOOVERS, http://www.hoovers.com/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
92 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, supra note 30. 
  
2014] Shareholder Proposals After Cracker Barrel 947 
 
B. Analysis of Shareholder Proposals 
1. Proponents of Shareholder Resolutions 
In 2012, the primary filers of social and environmental resolutions were 
pension funds (27%), socially responsible investors (SRIs) (27%), faith-based 
institutions (11%), special interest groups (10%), individuals (9%), unions 
(8%), and foundations (4%).93 As discussed below, whereas LGBT-inclusive 
proposals come from a variety of the groups listed above, LGBT-exclusive 
proposals come only from individual shareholders. 
a. Shareholder Proponents of LGBT-Inclusive Resolutions 
The New York City Common Retirement Fund (the “Fund”) is the leading 
pension fund filer, if not the leading filer of LGBT-inclusive resolutions.94 
The Fund “filed the first shareholder proposal addressing sexual orientation 
discrimination at Cracker Barrel”95 and as the “lead proponent of a filing 
group,” submitted resolutions at Exxon Mobil advocating for sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity protection.96 
The following SRIs have been most active in filing LGBT-inclusive res-
olutions: Walden Asset Management, Calvert Investments, and Trillium 
Asset Management.97 These investors generally adopt a multipronged approach 
to sustainable and responsible investing, incorporating the company’s stances 
on social issues into their investment criteria, leveraging their stock owner-
ship to engage in dialogue with companies and file shareholder resolutions, 
and exercising their clients’ positions on social issues through proxy voting.98 
Institutional shareholders with large holdings in a company, such as pen-
sion funds and SRIs, often have the greatest ability to effect policy change 
in the company. According to Shelley Alpern, Assistant Vice President of 
 
93 PROXY PREVIEW 2012, supra note 81, at 6. 
94 See 2012 NYC PENSION FUND POSTSEASON REPORT, supra note 86, at 6. The New 
York City Comptroller oversees the Fund, which consists of five New York City pension funds—
the New York City Board of Education Retirement System, the New York City Employees’ Retirement 
System, the New York City Fire Department Pension Fund, the New York City Police Pension Fund, 
and the New York City Teachers’ Retirement System. Id. at 1. As of May 2012, the value of the portfolio 
was roughly $150.3 billion. Lila Shapiro, Thomas DiNapoli, N.Y. Comptroller, Pushes Expanded Protections for 
LGBT Workers at ExxonMobil, HUFFPOST: GAY VOICES, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/24/ 
thomas-dinapoli-exxonmobil-lgbt_n_1543783.html (last updated May 25, 2012, 2:23 PM). 
95 PROXY PREVIEW 2011, supra note 82, at 18. 
96 Exxon Mobil Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 67 (Apr. 12, 2012). 
97 See PROXY PREVIEW 2012, supra note 81, at 6. 
98 See, e.g., Shareholder Engagement, WALDEN ASSET MGMT., http://www.waldenassetmgmt.com/ 
Investing-for-Change/shareholder-engagement (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
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Trillium Asset Management, “The advantage of having an institutional 
holder file these resolutions is that companies always return their phone 
calls. If they want dialogue, they get it.”99 Noninstitutional shareholders 
(e.g., the Pride Foundation, an LGBT philanthropic foundation, and the 
Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations, a faith-based institu-
tion) have also been active in filing LGBT-inclusive resolutions.100 
b. Shareholder Proponents of LGBT-Exclusive Resolutions 
In contrast to the organized shareholder activism surrounding LGBT-
inclusive resolutions discussed in the previous subsection, LGBT-exclusive 
resolutions are often filed by individuals who tend to have a small stock 
ownership in the company.101 Though these shareholder proponents may 
meet the minimum stock ownership necessary to file a shareholder resolu-
tion, they often lack the leverage necessary to engage the company’s officers 
and directors in meaningful dialogue to amend their policies. 
2. Content of Proposals 
The vast majority of shareholder resolutions to add or remove LGBT 
categories from a company’s EEO policy are LGBT-inclusive resolutions.102 
Though prior to 2008, the majority of LGBT-inclusive resolutions advocated 
for adding only sexual orientation to a company’s EEO policy, most of the 
recently filed shareholder resolutions have sought protections either for only 
gender identity (for companies that already have sexual orientation protec-
tion) or for both sexual orientation and gender identity.103 This likely 
reflects changing social mores about transgender rights; LGBT political 
changes, which began in the 1990s and led toward more inclusion of 
 
99 Sulkowski & Greenfield, supra note 38, at 938. 
100 See PROXY PREVIEW 2012, supra note 81, at 27 tbl. (chronicling diversity proposals and 
their proponents). 
101 Compare AmSouth Bancorp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 37-38 (Mar. 
16, 2006) (stating that the shareholder proponent of an LGBT-inclusive resolution, Walden Asset 
Management, owned 606,797 shares of AmSouth Bancorporation stock), with Am. Express Co., 
Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 18 (Mar. 22, 2006) (noting that the shareholder 
proponent of an LGBT-exclusive resolution, Mr. Thomas Strobhar, owned fifty shares of 
American Express Co. stock). 
102 See infra Table 5 (demonstrating that only 11 LGBT-exclusive resolutions were filed be-
tween 2005 and 2012, compared to 237 LGBT-inclusive resolutions). 
103 See id. (exhibiting a drastic increase in sexual orientation and gender identity LGBT-
inclusive resolutions beginning in 2008 and a concurrent drop in sexual orientation–only LGBT-
inclusive resolutions, which dropped to zero after 2009). 
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transgender individuals;104 and the seemingly minimal impact that gender 
identity inclusion in shareholder resolutions has on ultimate voting results.105 
Between 2005 and 2012, there were 248 LGBT-exclusive and LGBT-
inclusive shareholder resolutions filed—11 LGBT-exclusive resolutions and 
237 LGBT-inclusive resolutions.106 This amounts to, on average, slightly 
more than one LGBT-exclusive resolution per year (with a peak of 5 such 
resolutions in 2006) compared to just over 29 LGBT-inclusive resolutions 
per year (with a peak of 40 such resolutions in 2009).107 These resolutions 
were submitted to a total of 186 companies between 2005 and 2012: 177 
companies received LGBT-inclusive resolutions and 9 companies received 
LGBT-exclusive resolutions.108 
Of the 237 shareholder resolutions in favor of LGBT-inclusive EEO 
policies, 59 (25%) sought only sexual orientation protection, 41 (17%) sought 
only gender identity protection, and 137 (58%) sought both.109 Resolutions 
advocating for protections of only sexual orientation dropped precipitously 
in 2008, in favor of resolutions concerning both sexual orientation and 
gender identity.110 For example, in 2005, 22 of 26 LGBT-inclusive resolu-
tions advocated for only sexual orientation protections, while in 2012, 25 of 
29 LGBT-inclusive resolutions sought both sexual orientation and gender 
identity protections.111 
 
 
 
 
 
104 See, e.g., Amy L. Stone, More Than Adding a T: American Lesbian and Gay Activists’ Atti-
tudes Towards Transgender Inclusion, 12 SEXUALITIES 334, 335-336 (2009) (“Although gender 
variant individuals have always participated in the LGBT movement, there was a consolidation of 
transgender inclusion in the American LGBT movement in the mid-1990s.” (citation omitted)). 
105 See infra Table 8 (displaying an average vote for LGBT-inclusive resolutions of 29.6% 
(sexual orientation only), 24.2% (gender identity only), and 31.6% (sexual orientation and gender 
identity)). 
106 Infra Table 5. There is no way to determine the total number of shareholder resolutions 
that were actually filed, because the data relies on self-disclosure by companies or shareholder 
proponents. The total number of resolutions I include is thus constrained. 
107 Id. 
108 Database of shareholder resolutions on file with author. 
109 Infra Table 5. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
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Table 5: Shareholder Resolutions, 2005–2012, by Content: LGBT-Inclusive 
Versus LGBT-Exclusive, Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity112 
 LGBT-Inclusive Resolutions
Proxy Season 
LGBT-Exclusive 
Resolutions 
Sexual 
Orientation 
Gender 
Identity Both 
Total Inclusive 
Resolutions 
2005 1 22 1 3 26 
2006 5 19 0 6 25 
2007 2 12 2 10 24 
2008 1 5 3 27 35 
2009 0 1 13 26 40 
2010 0 0 9 20 29 
2011 1 0 9 20 29 
2012 1 0 4 25 29 
Total 2005–2012 11 59 41 137 237 
Average 2005–2012 1.375 7.375 5.125 17.0 29.5 
3. Outcomes of Shareholder Resolutions 
This subsection argues that while LGBT-inclusive shareholder resolu-
tions tend to fail when brought to a shareholder vote, they are generally 
successful in motivating companies to reform their EEO policies.113 A 
majority of companies where an LGBT-inclusive shareholder resolution 
fails ultimately adopt the employment protections originally requested by 
these resolutions.114 Of the LGBT-exclusive resolutions for which the 
outcome of the resolution was determined, they uniformly failed to effect 
removal of a company’s LGBT protections.115 
Table 6 demonstrates the outcomes of LGBT-inclusive and LGBT-
exclusive shareholder resolutions. Of LGBT-inclusive resolutions, 59% of 
proposals resulted in LGBT-inclusive changes to company policy, even 
when the proposals did not actually pass at the shareholder level.116 The 
most common outcome was that the resolutions were withdrawn (51%).117 
Shareholders less frequently voted to pass resolutions in their entirety (2%), 
or the resolutions seeking both sexual orientation and gender identity 
protection were withdrawn, with the company subsequently adopting only 
sexual orientation protection (5%).118 Of all LGBT-inclusive resolutions, 
 
112 Database of shareholder resolutions on file with author. 
113 See infra Table 7 (indicating that 64% of corporations that rejected LGBT-inclusive share-
holder resolutions later adopted their own LGBT-inclusive employment policies). 
114 See id. 
115 See infra Table 6. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
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30% were not adopted by the company, with a failed shareholder vote cited 
as the most common reason (27%).119 Much of the remaining LGBT-
inclusive resolutions are those that were withdrawn because the company 
already had an EEO policy in place that contained the protections the 
resolution sought (5% of LGBT-inclusive resolutions).120 
By examining shareholder proponents’ press releases, I found that 78% 
of the withdrawals of LGBT-inclusive proposals were a result of negotiated 
settlements with shareholders. Note that this figure is likely higher, as 
shareholder proponents may not have publicized every successful advocacy 
campaign.121 This figure is also consistent with the work of Paula Tkac, who 
found that concrete corporate responses followed the withdrawal of 79% of 
the social policy proposals in her sample.122 The strategies the shareholder 
proponents employ may determine whether the company is likely to adopt 
their desired policy change following the withdrawal of their proposals. 
While some proponents withdraw their proposal if the company simply 
opens lines of communication, many proponents of LGBT-inclusive 
proposals frequently take an “all-or-nothing” approach, withdrawing their 
proposals “only if the company agrees” to implement the resolution “in full.”123 
Of resolutions for LGBT-exclusive EEO Policies, 73% failed by share-
holder vote.124 The remaining resolutions were not put to a vote, and thus I 
was unable to determine the exact outcome of these resolutions. 
These statistics are consistent with Rojas’s research comparing the out-
comes of U.S. social policy proposals between 2000 and 2004. Rojas found 
the following outcomes for proposals addressing equal employment: 37.2% 
were voted on by shareholders, 53.8% were withdrawn, 6.9% were omitted, 
and 2.1% were not presented.125 According to Rojas’s research, the overall 
withdrawal rate among social policy proposals during this period was 27.7%, 
meaning that, at 53.8%, equal employment proposals were withdrawn with 
far greater frequency than other social policy proposals.126 Correspondingly, 
the rates at which equal employment proposals were voted on by shareholders 
or omitted were lower than the average: 6.9% of equal employment proposals 
 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 See Tkac, supra note 67, at 17 (noting that “proponents [tend] to trumpet successes and 
hide failures”). 
122 Id. at 417. 
123 CAROLYN MATHIASEN, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, 2013 PROXY SEASON 
PREVIEW: ENVIRONMENTAL & SOCIAL ISSUES (2012), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/ 
private/2013ISSPreviewES.pdf. 
124 See infra Table 6. 
125 Rojas et al., supra note 68, at 32 tbl.1. 
126 Id. 
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were omitted versus an overall average of 15.2%, and 37.2% of equal em-
ployment proposals were voted on compared to an overall average of 
54.3%.127 These findings are also consistent with Tkac’s research using social 
policy proposals gathered between 1992 and 2002, which found that anti-
discrimination proposals were the most likely to be withdrawn among social 
policy proposals.128 
The higher withdrawal rate for equal employment proposals is indicative 
of these proposals’ success, due perhaps to the more active engagement of 
institutional shareholders on this issue, changing social attitudes around 
LGBT workplace rights, and pressure to conform to the practices of peer 
companies. Equal employment proposals do not often appear on corporate 
ballots, likely indicating that their proponents are generally successful at 
negotiating settlements with companies. Further, this type of proposal’s 
lower rate of omission likely reflects the SEC’s current stance—generally 
including proposals for nondiscrimination policies, as discussed further in 
Part IV. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
127 Id. 
128 See Tkac, supra note 67, at 18 (“Antidiscrimination proposals are the most effective or 
successful. Roughly half of all these proposals are withdrawn likely because they often call for a 
relatively low-cost response, such as a statement of nondiscrimination policy or a release of 
information regarding EEOC practices . . . .”). 
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Table 6: Outcomes of LGBT-Inclusive Resolutions  
Versus LGBT-Exclusive Resolutions129 
Outcome
LGBT-Inclusive 
Resolutions
LGBT-Exclusive 
Resolutions 
Success 139 (59%) 0 (0%) 
Majority Vote 5 (2%) 0 (0%) 
Withdrawn 121 (51%) 0 (0%) 
Adopted Without Gender Identity Protections130 13 (5%) 0 (0%) 
Failure 70 (30%) 8 (73%) 
Failed by Vote 64 (27%) 8 (73%) 
SEC Permits Omission from Proxy Materials131 5 (2%) 0 (0%) 
Procedural Challenge 1 (.4%) 0 (0%) 
Other 28 (12%) 3 (27%) 
Existing Policy132 12 (5%) 0 (0%) 
Other 1 (7%) 3133 (27%) 
Total, 2005–2012 237 11 
 
However, the 30% failure rate of these resolutions is misleading when 
viewed in isolation. Rather, one must look to the LGBT-inclusive EEO 
policy in companies where these resolutions were filed to better analyze the 
effectiveness of such advocacy. Of the 33 companies where LGBT-inclusive 
resolutions failed at the shareholder level, 21 (64%) subsequently adopted 
 
129 Database of shareholder resolutions on file with author. 
130 These resolutions seek to add both sexual orientation and gender identity to a company’s 
EEO policy. They were withdrawn in exchange for the company’s agreement to add sexual 
orientation to their policy. See, e.g., 2010 NYC PENSION FUND POSTSEASON REPORT, supra 
note 86, at 15 (explaining that the Fund withdrew its resolution for EEO policies addressing both 
sexual orientation and gender identity at Chesapeake Energy Corporation after the company included 
sexual orientation protection and agreed “to continue dialogue on gender identity” protection). 
131 The company omitted these resolutions because the SEC, after evaluating the arguments 
of both the company and the shareholder proponent, determined it would not take action if the 
company omitted the resolution from its proxy materials. See, e.g., Commercial Metals Co., SEC 
No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 3252421, at *1 (Nov. 5, 2009) (stating that the Office of Chief Counsel 
of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance “will not recommend enforcement action to the 
Commission if CMC omits the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(10)”). 
132 The shareholder proponent withdrew these resolutions because the company had a preexisting 
EEO policy that satisfied the proposal’s requests. See, e.g., 2006 NYC PENSION FUND POSTSEASON 
REPORT, supra note 86, at 13 (describing how LGBT-inclusive shareholder resolutions were withdrawn 
at Convergys Corporation, Computer Sciences Corporation, and Fortune Brands because the companies 
verified preexisting policies that addressed the shareholder proponent’s recommendations). 
133 These three proposals were not subject to a vote for unknown reasons.  
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such policies and only 11 (33%) did not.134 Of the 21 companies that adopted 
LGBT-inclusive EEO policies, 10 did so as a result of shareholder action—9 
in response to another shareholder resolution and 1 in direct response to a 
shareholder vote.135 Of course, these findings must be viewed within the 
context discussed earlier, that most—but not all—of the sample’s withdrawn 
social policy resolutions have resulted in concrete corporate change. 
 
Table 7: Outcome at Companies Where an LGBT-Inclusive EEO Policy  
Was Brought to a Vote and Failed or Was Omitted in  
Accordance with an SEC No-Action Letter136 
Outcome Number of Companies 
Proposal Resubmitted in Later Year, Withdrawn Because 
Company Adopted LGBT-Inclusive EEO Policy 9 (27%) 
Proposal Resubmitted in Later Year, Brought to Vote and Passed 1 (3%) 
Company Adopted LGBT-Inclusive EEO Policy, Not Necessarily 
in Response to Shareholder Proposal137 11 (33%) 
Company Has Not Adopted LGBT-Inclusive EEO Policy as of 
Publication 11 (33%) 
Other 1 (3%)138 
Total, 2005—2012 33 
4. Voting Statistics for Shareholder Proposals 
Though both LGBT-inclusive and LGBT-exclusive resolutions generally 
fail when put to a vote,139 the results of the votes are nonetheless revealing 
about shareholders’ attitudes toward such resolutions and how their ac-
ceptance for such resolutions has grown over time. Two findings underscore 
this increased shareholder acceptance. First, the average vote for LGBT-
inclusive shareholder resolutions has increased slightly over time.140 Second, 
among companies where LGBT-inclusive resolutions were put to a vote 
 
134 See infra Table 7. 
135 Id. 
136 Database of shareholder resolutions on file with author. 
137 Though these eleven companies have adopted an LGBT-inclusive EEO policy, to date, 
they have not implemented the specific employment protections the proposals requested. 
138 This company was later acquired. 
139 See supra Table 6 (showing that sixty-four of the sixty-nine LGBT-inclusive resolutions 
subject to a shareholder vote between 2005 and 2012 failed to garner a majority). 
140 See infra Table 9 and text accompanying note 155. 
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more than once, most resolutions garnered more shareholder support in the 
second round.141 
LGBT-inclusive resolutions filed and voted on between 2005 and 2012 
garnered an average of only 30% shareholder support.142 Shareholder 
support was slightly stronger for resolutions that advocated for both sexual 
orientation and gender identity protections than for those that advocated 
for protections for only sexual orientation or only gender identity.143 
LGBT-exclusive resolutions subject to a vote have resulted in an extraordi-
narily low percentage of shareholder support—an average of 3.3%.144 
 
Table 8: Average Percentage Vote in Favor of Shareholder Resolutions,  
2005–2012: LGBT-Exclusive Versus LGBT-Inclusive145 
 LGBT-Exclusive 
Resolutions 
LGBT-Inclusive Resolutions
Sexual 
Orientation 
Gender 
Identity Both 
Total Inclusive 
Resolutions 
Average Vote in 
Favor of Resolution146 
3.3% 29.6% 24.2% 31.6% 30.0% 
Minimum 1.8%147 1.6%148 6.3%149 2.3%150 1.6% 
Maximum 6.1%151 52.3%152 43.2%153 61.7%154 61.7% 
Number of  
Resolutions 
8 14 11 44 69 
 
 
141 See infra text accompanying notes 163-66. 
142 See infra Table 8. 
143 Id.  
144 Id. 
145 Database of shareholder resolutions on file with author. 
146 This figure is calculated by dividing the number of shareholder votes in favor of the reso-
lution by the total number of votes on the resolution, discounting abstentions. Even some 
resolutions that yielded greater than 50% of the vote by this calculation failed because the law of 
the state of incorporation requires that abstentions be considered votes against the resolution. See, 
e.g., HCC Insurance Holdings, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 35 (Aug. 9, 2007) (“For the 
proposal to pass under Delaware law, the shares in favor must exceed 50% of the total shares 
present at the meeting, in person or by proxy, and entitled to vote . . . .”). 
147 See JPMorgan Chase & Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 18, 2006). 
148 EchoStar Commc’ns, Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 42 (Aug. 15, 2005). 
149 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 28 (Sept. 4, 2008). 
150 DISH Network Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 61 (Aug. 4, 2008). 
151 See Wells Fargo & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 84 (Aug. 8, 2008). 
152 See Expeditors Int’l of Wash., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 19 (Aug. 8, 2008). 
153 See Anadarko Petroleum Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 3 (May 21, 2012). 
154 See KBR, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (May 24, 2011). 
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Table 9 compares the average shareholder vote for LGBT-inclusive reso-
lutions from 2005 to 2008 versus the average vote for the period from 2009 
to 2012. Between 2009 and 2012, there was a slight increase in the maximum 
percentage of votes in favor of LGBT-inclusive resolutions as compared to 
the period between 2005 and 2008—61.7% versus 55.5%.155 
 
Table 9: Average Percentage Vote for LGBT-Inclusive Shareholder  
Resolutions, 2005–2008 Versus 2009–2012156 
 2005–2008 2009–2012 Total 
Average Percentage Vote in Favor of LGBT-
Inclusive Resolution 
27.2% 32.6% 30.0% 
Minimum 1.6%157 10.7%158 1.6%159 
Maximum 55.5%160 61.7%161 61.7%162 
Number of Resolutions 33 36 69 
 
Between 2005 and 2012, there were 16 companies that put LGBT-
inclusive resolutions to a vote multiple times.163 Of these, 12 showed an 
increase in the percentage of shareholder vote in favor of the resolutions, 
while 4 showed a decrease.164 The average absolute increase of support was 
9.8% across those 12 companies.165 The average absolute decrease of support 
for the resolutions was 6.5% across the other 4 companies.166 
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PROPOSALS BY SHAREHOLDER 
PROPONENTS AND COMPANIES 
This Part outlines the arguments advanced by shareholder proponents 
and companies’ boards of directors for and against LGBT-inclusive and 
LGBT-exclusive shareholder resolutions. Setting aside the persuasiveness 
 
155 See infra Table 9. 
156 Database of shareholder resolutions on file with author. 
157 See EchoStar Commc’ns, Corp., supra note 148, at 42. 
158 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 3 (June 9, 2011). 
159 See EchoStar Commc’ns, Corp., supra note 148, at 42. 
160 See Micron Tech., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 36 (Jan. 16, 2007). 
161 See KBR, Inc., supra note 154, at 2. 
162 Id. 
163  Database of shareholder resolutions on file with author. Note that the first vote and last 
vote may advocate for different protections (e.g., sexual orientation only versus sexual orientation 
and gender identity). 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
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and accuracy of these arguments, this Part also examines these arguments in 
the context of the SEC’s response to requests for favorable no-action letters. 
It explores, for example, which arguments advanced by shareholder propo-
nents and boards of directors have succeeded and which have failed before 
the SEC. 
A. LGBT-Inclusive Resolutions 
1. Arguments Advanced by Shareholder Proponents in Favor of  
LGBT-Inclusive Resolutions 
Shareholder proposals in favor of instituting LGBT-inclusive resolu-
tions typically ask companies to simply amend their nondiscrimination 
policies to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or both.167 However, some request that the company take a much 
broader view of nondiscrimination—for example, prohibiting discrimination 
not only in the hiring and firing of employees but also in corporate advertising 
and corporate donations.168 To support their recommendations, shareholders 
cite a variety of rationales in their proposals filed with the company’s proxy 
materials. Broadly, the rationales advanced by shareholders fall into the 
following four categories: (1) peer influence, (2) public opinion, (3) employee-
focused, and (4) company-focused. 
a. Peer Influence 
Rationales leveraging peer influence typically cite statistics on the com-
pany’s peers—by revenue, size, industry, or location—that have instituted 
LGBT-inclusive EEO policies or other LGBT-friendly employee benefits 
or programs. For example, shareholders have highlighted the following: 
• Many similarly sized peer companies have instituted LGBT-inclusive 
EEO policies, typically, citing the proportion of Fortune 500 companies, 
 
167 See, e.g., Am. Fin. Grp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 18 (Apr. 2, 2012) 
(requesting that “American Financial Group amend its written equal employment opportunity 
policy to explicitly prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity and to 
substantially implement the policy”). 
168 See, e.g., Eastman Chem. Co., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 17 (Mar. 
20, 2008) (“A number of Fortune 500 corporations have implemented non-discrimination policies 
encompassing the following principles: . . . [c]orporate advertising policy will avoid the use of 
negative stereotypes based on sexual orientation or gender identity . . . [, t]here shall be no 
discrimination in the sale of goods and services based on sexual orientation or gender identity, 
and . . . [t]here shall be no policy barring on corporate charitable contributions to groups and 
organizations based on sexual orientation.”); Murphy Oil Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement 
(Schedule 14A), at 24 (Mar. 28, 2008) (same). 
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according to the HRC Equality Index, that prohibit employment discrim-
ination based on sexual orientation or gender identity or expression;169 
• Many of the company’s industry peers and competitors have instituted 
LGBT-inclusive EEO policies;170 and 
• Many of the company’s peers with headquarters in the same city have 
instituted LGBT-inclusive EEO policies.171 
Note that while I categorize the statement of a company’s existing poli-
cies as “Other” and do not label it a successful outcome in Table 6, the 
confirmation that a company’s existing policies provide workplace protec-
tions for LGBT employees can also be a successful outcome, particularly 
where the company’s policies are unclear. 
b. Public Opinion 
Shareholder proponents also argue that public opinion has shifted in 
favor of equal rights in the workplace for LGBT individuals. In proposals 
seeking policy change, shareholders have emphasized the following: 
• National opinion polls support providing equal workplace rights to 
LGBT individuals;172  
 
169 E.g., Am. Fin. Grp., supra note 167, at 18 (proposing a sexual orientation nondiscrimina-
tion policy and highlighting that “[o]ver 89% of the Fortune 500 companies have adopted written 
nondiscrimination policies prohibiting harassment and discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation”); AmSouth Bancorp., supra note 101, at 38 (“AmSouth is increasingly alone in its 
position [of lacking an explicit nondiscrimination policy], as 98% of Fortune 100 companies, and 
more than 80% of the Fortune 500 companies, have adopted written nondiscrimination policies 
prohibiting discrimination and harassment on the basis of sexual orientation . . . .” (internal 
citation omitted)). While most shareholder proposals that employ this rationale focus solely on the 
existence of written nondiscrimination policies, some also cite statistics on the percentage of 
companies that utilize other methods of communicating LGBT tolerance, such as diversity 
training programs, employee access to affinity groups, domestic partner health insurance, and 
other LGBT-friendly employee benefits and policies. E.g., Commercial Metals Co., Definitive 
Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 48 (Dec. 12, 2008). 
170 E.g., Expeditors Int’l of Wash., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 23 (Apr. 4, 
2006) (“Our competitors EGL and UPS explicitly prohibit this form of discrimination in their 
written policies, according to the Human Rights Campaign.”). 
171 E.g., AmSouth Bancorp., supra note 101, at 38 (“Other major corporate employers in Bir-
mingham including General Motors, Regions Financial, Saks, Inc[.], and University of Alabama, also 
explicitly prohibit this form of discrimination in their written policies.”); Commercial Metals Co., 
supra note 169, at 48 (“Other major corporate employers located in Texas . . . explicitly prohibit this 
form of discrimination in their written policies.”); Pentair, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement 
(Schedule 14A), at 41 (Mar. 23, 2007). 
172 See, e.g., Advance Auto Parts, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 12 (Apr. 
13, 2005) (“National public opinion polls consistently find more than three-quarters of the 
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• Increasingly, heterosexuals have supported providing equal workplace 
rights to LGBT individuals;173 and 
• Many states and localities prohibit employment discrimination based 
on sexual orientation, gender identity, or both.174 
c. Employee-Focused 
Employee-focused arguments describe the detrimental effects of em-
ployment discrimination on employees. These justifications have included 
the following: 
• LGBT employees frequently experience discrimination in the work-
place, as evidenced by recent survey data;175 and 
• “Employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation dimin-
ishes employee morale and productivity.”176 
 
American people support equal rights in the workplace for gay men, lesbians and bisexuals.”); 
Amerco, Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 33 (July 18, 2012) (same). 
173 See, e.g., Expeditors Int’l of Wash., supra note 170, at 23 (“According to a September 2005 
survey by Harris Interactive and Witeck–Combs, 57% of heterosexual respondents consider it 
extremely or very important that a company have a written non-discrimination policy that 
includes sexual orientation, compared to only 43% in 2002.”). 
174 E.g., Am. Fin. Grp., supra note 167, at 18 (“Twenty-one states, the District of Columbia 
and more than 160 cities and counties, have laws prohibiting employment discrimination based on 
sexual orientation; 12 states and the District of Columbia have laws prohibiting employment 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.”); AmSouth Bancorp., supra note 
101, at 38 (“Sixteen states, the District of Columbia and more than 140 cities, including St. Louis, 
have laws prohibiting employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.”); see also Anadarko 
Petroleum Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 86 (Mar. 23, 2012) (“[C]ourts 
have sometimes interpreted other antidiscrimination statues [sic], like those protecting individuals based 
on their gender, to include gender identity . . . . [T]he jobs web site of the U.S. federal government 
includes language that explicitly bans employment discrimination based on gender identity.”). 
175 E.g., Advance Auto Parts, Inc., supra note 172, at 12 (“A recent National Gay and Lesbian 
Task Force study has found that 16%-44% gay men and lesbians in twenty cities nationwide 
experienced workplace harassment or discrimination based on their sexual orientation.”); 
AmSouth Bancorp., supra note 101, at 38 (“According to a September 2002 survey by Harris 
Interactive and Witeck–Combs, 41% of gay and lesbian workers in the United States reported an 
experience with some form of job discrimination related to sexual orientation; almost one out of 
every 10 gay or lesbian adults also stated that they had been fired or dismissed unfairly from a 
previous job, or pressured to quit a job because of their sexual orientation.”). 
176 E.g., DISH Network Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 32 (Apr. 25, 
2008); see also HCC Ins. Holdings, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 42 (Apr. 
13, 2007) (proposing a nondiscrimination policy for sexual orientation, in part, because such 
discrimination “diminishes employee morale”). 
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d. Company-Focused 
Company-focused arguments describe the positive effects that LGBT-
inclusive EEO policies can have on the company’s bottom line. The following 
are examples of company-focused reasons that shareholders have cited: 
• “[C]orporations that prohibit workplace discrimination, including dis-
crimination on the basis of gender identity, have a competitive ad-
vantage in recruiting and retaining employees;”177 
• “[The] company has operations in, and makes sales to, institutions in 
states and cities that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation;”178 
• “The company has an interest in preventing discrimination and resolv-
ing complaints internally so as to avoid costly litigation and damage its 
reputation as an equal opportunity employer;”179 and 
• Some cities “have adopted legislation restricting business with companies 
that do not guarantee equal treatment for gay and lesbian employees.”180 
2. Companies’ Responses Against LGBT-Inclusive Resolutions 
Proxy materials sent to shareholders not only give the shareholder pro-
ponent a platform for making arguments in favor of the resolution, but also 
permit the board of directors to respond to the resolution and recommend 
their own course of action.181 Boards of directors almost uniformly recom-
mend against implementing LGBT-inclusive resolutions—I was unable to 
find a single instance of a board of directors offering support for such a 
resolution and only found one instance of a board of directors that declined 
to respond to the proposal.182 As discussed below, boards of directors 
typically advance the following arguments against these resolutions: (1) the 
company’s existing EEO policy provides adequate protections; (2) the 
company complies with the requirements of federal law; (3) there has been a 
 
177 E.g., Anadarko Petroleum Corp., supra note 174, at 86; Pentair, Inc., supra note 171, at 41. 
178 E.g., AmSouth Bancorp., supra note 101, at 38; Eastman Chem. Co., supra note 168, at 17. 
179 E.g., DISH Network Corp., supra note 176, at 32; HCC Ins. Holdings, Inc., supra note 
176, at 42. 
180 E.g., Amerco, supra note 172, at 32; Eastman Chem. Co., supra note 168, at 17. 
181 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(m) (2013) (“The company may elect to include in its proxy 
statement reasons why it believes shareholders should vote against [a] proposal. The company is 
allowed to make arguments reflecting its own point of view . . . .”). 
182 See Amerco, supra note 172, at 33 (affirming the company’s intolerance for discrimination 
or harassment but stating that “[t]he Board makes no recommendation with respect to this 
proposal” (emphasis omitted)). 
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lack of shareholder support at the company and at other companies for such 
proposals; or (4) other arguments regarding finance or competition. 
a. Unnecessary to Revise Existing EEO Policy 
The most common rationale given by companies against LGBT-
inclusive resolutions is that it is not necessary to revise the company’s 
existing EEO policy. For example, boards have asserted the following: 
• There is no need to adopt the shareholder’s proposal because the com-
pany’s current policies provide adequate protections to LGBT individ-
uals against discrimination;183 and 
• The company has not had any complaints filed against it for discrimi-
nation by sexual orientation or gender identity.184 
b. Company Complies with the Requirements of Federal Law 
Additionally, companies argue that their current EEO policies comply 
with federal law and that additional protections are not necessary. For 
example, companies have argued as follows: 
• Federal law does not prohibit employment discrimination on the bases 
of sexual orientation and gender identity;185 and 
 
183 See, e.g., Leggett & Platt, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 29 (Mar. 30, 
2012) (“We are committed to the highest ethical standards, which include assuring equal employment 
and promotional opportunities free of discrimination on any basis other than merit and performance-related 
qualifications.”); W. Refining, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 27 (Apr. 16, 2009) 
(“Western Refining has a zero tolerance policy for any conduct that is intended to or has the effect 
of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. We hire and promote on the 
basis of merit and performance.”). Companies may also discuss extensively the protections in place 
for other groups, seemingly to distract shareholders from the resolution’s core issue—that the 
company lacks explicit protections for LGBT individuals. See, e.g., Gardner Denver, Inc., 
Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 27 (Mar. 17, 2010) (“Our global Code of Ethics and 
Business Conduct . . . expressly prohibits discrimination and harassment based on characteristics 
protected by law, such as race, color, national origin, religion, gender, age, marital status, disability, 
veteran status or citizenship status.”); W. Refining, Inc., supra, at 27 (“Our Code of Business 
Conduct and Ethics and our Personnel Reference Manual . . . expressly prohibit discrimination, 
sexual harassment or other unlawful harassment based on . . . any . . . legally-protected category 
under federal, state or local law.”). 
184 See, e.g., Gardner Denver, Inc., supra note 183, at 27 (“In a company with more than 6,000 
employees operating in 33 countries, the Board and executive officers of the Company are not 
aware of a single complaint of discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity being 
reported through our ethics hotline established pursuant to our Code of Ethics and Business 
Conduct filed with any city, state or federal agency.”). 
185 See, e.g., Commercial Metals Co., supra note 169, at 49 (“Congress has repeatedly declined 
to add sexual orientation and gender identity/expression to those forms of discrimination 
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• The company’s current EEO policy meets the requirements of federal 
law.186 
c. Lack of Shareholder Support 
Companies also frequently cite the failure of previous shareholder votes 
on LGBT-inclusive resolutions as evidence that shareholders generally 
disfavor such resolutions. For example, board responses have included the 
following: 
• Previous votes for nondiscrimination policies for LGBT employees at 
the company have failed;187 and 
• Previous votes for nondiscrimination policies for LGBT employees at 
other companies have failed.188 
d. Other Responses 
Companies have also cited a variety of other reasons for their opposition 
to LGBT-inclusive resolutions, including the following: 
• Providing nondiscrimination protections to LGBT employees would lead 
to proponents “later seek[ing] to add domestic partner benefits to [the 
Company’s] medical and other benefits plans, which could add significant 
costs . . . and place the Company at a disadvantage to . . . competitors who 
do not offer [such] benefits;”189 
 
specifically prohibited under federal law.”); EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., Definitive Proxy 
Statement (Schedule 14A), at 26 (Aug. 24, 2005) (“The Board believes that adding to our written 
policy additional special categories which are not prohibited by federal law undercuts our objective 
of highlighting federally prohibited activities.”). 
186 See, e.g., KBR, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 70 (Apr. 6, 2011) (“The 
Board of Directors does not believe it is in the best interest of the company or its employees to 
expand the list of personal attributes covered by KBR’s nondiscrimination policy beyond those 
which are protected by federal law. To do so would, we believe, weaken the comprehensive nature 
of the policy . . . .”). 
187 E.g., Leggett & Platt, Inc., supra note 183, at 29 (“Leggett’s shareholders defeated similar 
proposals at the Company’s last six annual meetings. We believe this consistent rejection by 
shareholders sends a clear message to our Board that Leggett should oppose this unnecessary 
addition to our nondiscrimination policy.”); TECO Energy, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement 
(Schedule 14A), at 31 (March 14, 2012) (“[L]ess than one-quarter of the votes cast at the 2011 
annual meeting on this matter were for the proposal.”). 
188 E.g., Commercial Metals Co., supra note 169, at 49 (“In those instances where stockholders 
at other companies have been allowed to vote on proposals of this nature they generally have not 
received majority support.”). 
189 E.g., id. at 49; Leggett & Platt, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 27 
(Mar. 27, 2008). 
  
2014] Shareholder Proposals After Cracker Barrel 963 
 
• There is no evidence that the lack of a nondiscrimination policy for 
LGBT employees puts the company at a competitive disadvantage in 
attracting and retaining employees;190 
• The company’s policies are similar to those of many peer companies;191 and 
• Implementing protections for LGBT employees would “divert atten-
tion from the overall goal of a truly non-discriminatory workplace.”192 
3. SEC Response to LGBT-Inclusive Resolutions 
a. Failed Arguments for Excluding LGBT-Inclusive Proposals 
This subsection describes the substantive grounds proffered by companies 
and rejected by the SEC for excluding an LGBT-inclusive shareholder 
proposal. 
Rule 14a-8(i)(3) allows a company to exclude a shareholder proposal if it 
violates proxy rules193 (e.g., the Rule 14a-9 prohibition against making false 
and misleading statements in a proxy statement).194 In 2004, OGE Energy 
argued unsuccessfully that statements about LGBT employment discrimi-
nation and the competitive edge that can be gained from prohibiting such 
discrimination are false and misleading because they imply that the company 
currently discriminates against LGBT employees and that the company is at 
a competitive disadvantage.195 The company also argued unsuccessfully that 
statements about state and local legislation prohibiting LGBT employment 
 
190 See, e.g., Eastman Chem. Co., supra note 168, at 18 (“[T]he Company does not believe that 
it suffers any competitive disadvantage in recruiting or retaining employees or in customer 
relationships as a result of its employment practices or the language contained in its nondiscrimi-
nation policy.”); KBR, Inc., supra note 186, at 70 (“[W]e believe that our current policy against 
discrimination and harassment and our procedures to ensure that discrimination does not occur, 
put us in a position to recruit and retain a diverse workforce of many different cultures, races and 
backgrounds who each contribute their unique experiences to KBR’s projects and customers.”). 
191 See, e.g., TECO Energy, Inc., supra note 187, at 31 (“The proponent’s statement refers to 
statistics which appear to present our company’s policies as being inconsistent with our peer 
companies; however, our non-discrimination policy is actually similar to that of the vast majority 
of other Fortune 1000 companies.”). 
192 See, e.g., ConocoPhillips, Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 87 (Mar. 31, 2011) 
(“It is not practical or even possible to list all categories on which to prohibit discrimination. The 
Board believes that such an effort would only divert attention from the overall goal of a truly non-
discriminatory workplace.”). 
193 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(3) (2013). 
194 Id. § 240.14a-9. 
195 See OGE Energy, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 351798, at *7-8 (Feb. 24, 2004) 
(rejecting OGE’s characterization of a proposal as “false or misleading” based on their perceived 
implication of a competitive disadvantage). 
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discrimination are false and misleading because they imply that the company 
is violating the law.196 
Rule 14a-8(i)(7) permits a company to exclude a shareholder proposal 
“[i]f the proposal deals with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary 
business operations.”197 Salary and other employment issues “go to the heart 
of the ordinary business exclusion,” since management is likely to be in a 
more informed position than shareholders to determine the salary levels 
that would best attract and retain talent.198 However, in 1976, the SEC 
created a “‘significant social policy’ exception to allow shareholder proposals 
that raise important issues to be included in management’s proxy materials 
even when those issues concern the company’s ordinary business.”199 In 
1992, the SEC initially suggested, regarding the first LGBT-inclusive 
proposal, “that employment-based proposals would be treated as ordinary 
business decisions even if they raised significant social policy issues and 
would therefore always be excludable by corporations”—the “Cracker Barrel 
Standard.”200 However, in 1998, the SEC eliminated the Cracker Barrel 
Standard, determining that “the relative importance of certain social issues 
relating to employment matters has reemerged as a consistent topic of 
widespread public debate.”201 
The SEC now considers two factors in determining whether a proposal 
falls within the ordinary business operations exclusion: (1) whether the 
“task[ is] so fundamental to management’s ability to run [the] company on a 
day-to-day basis that [it] could not, as a practical matter, be subject to direct 
shareholder oversight;” and (2) “the degree to which the proposal seeks to 
‘micro-manage’ the company by probing too deeply into matters of a complex 
nature upon which shareholders . . . would not be in a position to make an 
informed judgment.”202 In 2008, the SEC granted a request by Apache Corpo-
ration to exclude an LGBT-inclusive proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(7)—the 
exclusion was confirmed by a declaratory judgment in the Southern District 
of Texas.203 The shareholder proponent’s proposal advocated for the adoption 
of a nondiscrimination policy prohibiting discrimination across various facets 
 
196 See id. at *11 (“The Company argues that these clauses [in the proposal] falsely imply that 
OGE is violating state and local law. Again, [the SEC] do[es] not believe the statements imply 
this . . . .”). 
197 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7). 
198 Roy, supra note 5, at 1523. 
199 Id. at 1522 (footnote omitted). 
200 Id. at 1524 (footnote omitted). 
201 Id. at 1526. 
202 Id. at 1526-27. 
203 Id. at 1514. 
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of the company’s culture, including “the recognition of employee 
groups[,] . . . corporate advertising and marketing policy[, and] . . . corporate 
charitable contributions to groups.”204 The court found that several of the 
above principles in the shareholder resolution did not “implicate the 
underlying social policy, [and that] the Proposal [sought to] micromanage 
the company to an unacceptable degree.”205  
This case seems to have ended the offering of LGBT-inclusive proposals 
based on broad notions of nondiscrimination that affect matters outside of 
direct employment policy, such as the Equality Principles. However, it does 
not seem to have impacted the success of “plain-vanilla” proposals that 
simply aim to include sexual orientation or gender identity in a company’s 
existing EEO policy. Although companies have frequently attempted to exclude 
proposals under the ordinary business operations exclusion, with the exception 
of Apache Corporation, this approach has generally been unsuccessful.206 
Rule 14a-8(i)(10) allows a company to exclude a shareholder “[i]f the 
company has already substantially implemented the proposal.”207 In 2007 
and 2009, the SEC refused to permit Armor Holdings, Incorporated and 
Chesapeake Energy, respectively, to exclude shareholder proposals to add 
both sexual orientation and gender identity to the companies’ EEO policies 
on the basis of substantial implementation, when their current EEO policy 
included only sexual orientation.208 In 2004, the SEC refused to permit 
both OGE Energy, Incorporated and Emerson Electric Company to 
exclude LGBT-inclusive shareholder proposals on the basis of substantial 
implementation when they had not explicitly included the protected 
characteristics—for example, “sexual orientation”—in their formal EEO 
policies.209 Additionally, when the shareholder proposal requests that the 
company amend its EEO policy, excluding the proposal and pointing to 
 
204 Id. at 1513 n.6. 
205 Apache Corp. v. N.Y.C. Employees’ Retirement Sys., 2008 WL 1821728, No. 08-1064, at 
*452-53 (Apr. 22, 2008). 
206 See infra Tables 10-11 (enumerating unsuccessful and successful bases for exclusion). 
207 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(10) (2013). 
208 See Armor Holdings, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 1152669, at *6 (Apr. 3, 2007); 
Chesapeake Energy Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 926908 (Mar. 30, 2009). 
209 See Emerson Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 2495093, at *6 (Oct. 20, 2004) 
(“[W]e believe that it is important for the Company to adopt a formal, written EEO policy including 
the words ‘sexual orientation’ . . . . Mentioning sexual orientation in training materials is not a 
substitute for including it an [sic] EEO policy . . . .”); OGE Energy, Inc., supra note 195, at *9-10. 
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other human resources documents, such as an anti-harassment policy would 
also not be sufficient.210 
Rule 14a-8(i)(12) allows a company to exclude “[r]esubmissions” where 
“the proposal deals with substantially the same subject matter as another 
proposal or proposals that has or have been previously included in the 
company’s proxy materials within the preceding 5 calendar years.”211 In 
2004, Emerson Electric argued that it could exclude a proposal because state 
law requires it to consider abstentions and broker nonvotes in determining 
whether the proposal passed, thus reducing the percentage of votes in favor 
of the proposal, when compared to the percentages of votes for and 
against.212 The SEC, however, had stated that, for the purposes of Rule 14a-
8(i)(12), the voting percentage should be determined using only votes cast 
for and votes cast against the proposal, excluding abstensions.213 Therefore, 
the SEC did not permit Emerson Electric to exclude the proposal on these 
grounds, underscoring that Rule 14a-8(i)(12) is independent of state law 
mandates for calculating voting percentages regarding approval of share-
holder proposals.214 
 
Table 10: Failed Arguments for Excluding LGBT-Inclusive  
Resolutions Proffered by Companies 
Date of SEC Letter Company Failed Arguments for Exclusion 
February 24, 2004 OGE Energy, Inc. 14a-8(i)(3), 14a-8(i)(7), 14a-8(i)(10) 
October 20, 2004 Emerson Electric Co. 14a-8(i)(10), 14a-8(i)(12) 
March 2, 2006 Aquila, Inc. 14a-8(i)(10) 
April 3, 2007 Armor Holdings, Inc. 14a-8(i)(7), 14a-8(i)(10) 
March 30, 2009 Chesapeake Energy Corp. 14a-8(i)(10) 
January 6, 2010 Verizon Communications, Inc. 14a-8(b), 14a-8(f), 14a-8(i)(3) 
March 20, 2012 Exxon Mobil 14a-8(i)(7) 
 
210 See Emerson Elec. Co., supra note 209, at *1-2 (presenting Emerson’s argument for sub-
stantial implementation on the bases of “an official company-wide policy barring all discrimina-
tion” and a “hotline for reporting discrimination and other complaints”). 
211 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(12). This rule further states that such proposals may be excluded 
“from [the company’s] proxy materials for any meeting held within 3 calendar years of the last 
time it was included,” subject to certain voting thresholds. Id. 
212 See Emerson Elec. Co., supra note 209, at *2 (including abstentions in the voting tabula-
tion, and noting that the proposal in question had not garnered enough support to require 
inclusion in the company’s proxy materials). 
213 Id. at *8. 
214 Id. at *7-8. 
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b. Successful Arguments for Excluding LGBT-Inclusive Proposals 
The SEC has infrequently permitted the exclusion of LGBT-inclusive 
proposals. Of the four LGBT-inclusive resolutions I found that have been 
excluded since 2000, two were excluded on procedural grounds.215 In 2009, 
the SEC permitted American Financial Group to exclude a proposal based 
on Rule 14a-8(h)(3) because neither the shareholder proponent nor a 
representative appeared at the prior year’s annual meeting to present a 
similar proposal.216 Additionally, the shareholder proponent failed to 
provide “‘good cause’ for its failure to appear.”217 Further, in 2012, the SEC 
permitted Alpha Natural Resources to exclude a proposal based on Rule 14a-
8(e)(2) because the shareholder proponent did not submit the proposal by 
the deadline.218 
I found two instances of the SEC permitting exclusion of LGBT-
inclusive proposals on substantive grounds.219 As discussed in the previous 
subsection, in 2008, the SEC permitted Apache Corporation to exclude a 
proposal on the basis of Rule 14a-8(i)(7) because the proposal had a broad 
notion of nondiscrimination that touched matters—such as marketing and 
corporate donations—beyond direct employment matters that would be covered 
by an EEO policy.220 Additionally, in 2009, the SEC permitted Commercial 
Metals Company to exclude a proposal based on Rule 14a-8(i)(10), finding that 
the company had substantially implemented the proposal’s recommendations 
by amending its EEO policy to explicitly include sexual orientation and 
gender identity.221 
Not only has the SEC generally refused to issue favorable no-action let-
ters on LGBT-inclusive resolutions, it has also generally not required 
shareholder proponents to modify their proposals. In fact, I have found only 
one such instance since 2000 in which the SEC permitted the company to 
exclude the proposal, barring amendment by the shareholder.222 As dis-
cussed earlier in subsection III.B.4, employment-based shareholder pro-
posals have a lower rate of omission than average among social policy 
proposals—6.9% versus 15.2%. 
 
215 See infra Table 11. 
216 Am. Fin. Grp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 800013, at *2 (Mar. 6, 2009). 
217 Id. 
218 Alpha Natural Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 58, at *1. 
219 See infra Table 11. 
220 See supra notes 203-06. 
221 Commercial Metals Co., supra note 131, at *1. 
222 See Emerson Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 1634117, at *1 (Oct. 27, 2000) 
(stating that the company may exclude an LGBT-inclusive proposal, unless the shareholder 
proponent deletes a specific clause). 
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Table 11: Successful Arguments for Excluding LGBT-Inclusive  
Resolutions Proffered by Companies 
Date of SEC Letter Company Successful Arguments for Exclusion 
March 5, 2008 Apache Corp. 14a-8(i)(7)
March 6, 2009 American Financial Group 14a-8(h)(3)
November 5, 2009 Commercial Metals Co. 14a-8(i)(10)
March 5, 2012 Alpha Natural Resources 14a-8(e)(2)
B. LGBT-Exclusive Resolutions 
1. Arguments Used by Shareholders for LGBT-Exclusive Resolutions 
Shareholder proponents seeking to remove sexual orientation or gender 
identity from a company’s EEO policies typically provide reasons that fall 
within one or more of the following categories: (1) sexual orientation is a 
private matter; (2) the company should not provide benefits to LGBT 
individuals or their partners; and (3) society has traditionally discouraged or 
prohibited homosexual acts. 
a. Sexual Orientation Is a Private Matter 
Shareholder proponents of LGBT-exclusive resolutions often argue that 
sexual orientation is a private matter, particularly in the workplace. The 
following are some of the arguments shareholder proponents have advanced 
in support of this claim: 
 
• “[U]nlike the issues of race, age, gender and certain physical disabili-
ties, it would be impossible to discern a person’s sexual orientation from 
their appearance;”223 
• “[I]t would be inappropriate and possibly illegal to ask a job applicant 
or employee about their sexual interests, inclinations and activities;”224 
• “[I]t is likewise inappropriate and legally problematic for employees to 
discuss personal sexual matters on the job;”225 and 
• The U.S. Armed Forces had a “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy for eighteen 
years.226 
 
223 E.g., Pac. Gas & Elec., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 77 (Apr. 2, 2012). 
224 E.g., Am. Express Co., supra note 101, at 18 (Mar. 22, 2006). 
225 E.g., Ford Motor Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 56 (Apr. 7, 2006). 
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b. The Company Should Not Provide Benefits to LGBT Individuals or Their 
Partners 
Shareholder proponents of LGBT-exclusive resolutions also argue that 
including sexual orientation or gender identity in the company’s EEO 
policy is a necessary precedent to offering benefits for domestic partners.227 
Opposition to providing benefits for domestic partners is further fueled by 
the belief that people who have same-sex relations are at an increased risk 
for sexually transmitted diseases, and the company should not provide 
benefits to people who willfully engage in risky behavior.228 
c. Society Has Traditionally Discouraged or Prohibited Same-Sex Relations 
Shareholder proponents have also posited that companies should remove 
sexual orientation or gender identity from their nondiscrimination policies 
because society has traditionally discouraged same-sex relations and encour-
aged marriage between heterosexuals. Some of the arguments shareholder 
proponents have offered in support of this claim include the following: 
• “[Unmarried, homosexual] relations have been condemned by the major 
traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam for a thousand years or 
more;”229 
• “[M]arriage between heterosexuals has been protected and encouraged 
by a wide range of societies, cultures and faiths for ages;”230 and 
• “[C]ohabitation, regardless of sexual orientation, is illegal in . . . 
several . . . states.”231 
 
226 See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec., supra note 223, at 77 (“[T]he Armed Forces of the United 
States is one of the largest and most diverse organizations in the world. They protected the 
security of us all while adhering to a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell policy’ regarding sexual interests for 18 
years from 1993–2011.”). 
227 See, e.g., Am. Express Co., supra note 101, at 18 (“[A]ccording to the Human Rights Cam-
paign (HRC), the largest national lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender political organization, on 
their website states, ‘an inclusive non-discrimination policy (one that refers to sexual orientation) 
is a key facet of the rationale for extending domestic partner benefits.’ The HRC adds, ‘Establish-
ing a benefits policy that includes your company’s gay and lesbian employees is a logical outgrowth 
of your company’s own non-discrimination policy . . . .’” (omission in original)). 
228 See, e.g., id. (“[O]ur company does not discriminate against tobacco users when they apply 
for a job even though they are not protected by any employment clause. It also does not pay 
tobacco users benefits based on their engaging in this personally risky behavior . . . . [T]hose who 
engage in homosexual sex are at a significantly higher risk for HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted 
diseases.”). 
229 E.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., supra note 223, at 77. 
230 E.g., id. 
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2. Companies’ Responses Against LGBT-Exclusive EEO Policies 
As with LGBT-inclusive EEO policies, boards of directors often recom-
mend against LGBT-exclusive policies.232 Boards of directors typically detail 
the following categories of rationales for their recommendations: (1) imple-
menting an LGBT-exclusive EEO policy may spark litigation against the 
company; (2) implementing an LGBT-exclusive EEO policy would harm 
the company’s business; and (3) other arguments. 
a. Implementing an LGBT-Exclusive EEO Policy May Spark Litigation Against 
the Company 
Boards of directors have warned shareholders of the risk of lawsuits re-
sulting from removing sexual orientation or gender identity from the 
company’s EEO policy, arguing the following: 
• Implementing an LGBT-exclusive EEO policy may incite “lawsuits 
that could diminish shareholder value;”233 and 
• Implementing an LGBT-exclusive EEO policy would result in viola-
tions of the laws of many states and cities that prohibit discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.234 
b. Implementing an LGBT-Exclusive EEO Policy Would Harm the Company’s 
Business 
In addition to the above, companies have also described various ways in 
which an EEO policy without reference to sexual orientation or gender 
identity would hurt the company’s business, such as the following: 
• An LGBT-exclusive EEO policy would hinder the company’s ability to 
maintain a diverse workforce;235 and 
 
231 E.g., Am. Express Co., supra note 101, at 18. 
232 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., supra note 225, at 56-57 (opposing a proposal to amend Ford’s 
EEO policy to exclude any reference to privacy issues related to sexual interests, activities, or 
orientation). 
233 E.g., Bank of Am., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 45 (Mar. 20, 2006). 
234 E.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., supra note 223, at 78 (“The proposed amendment to the Policy 
Statement (i.e., deletion of any reference to sexual orientation) would make the Policy Statement 
inconsistent with California state law, which prohibits harassment and discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation.”). 
235 E.g., Ford Motor Co., supra note 225, at 57 (“Ford, and numerous other leading compa-
nies, believe that a diverse workforce, free of discrimination, is the most advantageous environ-
ment to attract and retain talented employees and to allow them to excel in their jobs. 
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• An LGBT-exclusive EEO policy would hinder the ability of the com-
pany to work with clients that are prohibited from doing business with 
entities “that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.”236 
c. Other Arguments 
Other arguments that boards of directors have advanced in opposition to 
LGBT-exclusive resolutions include the following: 
• An LGBT-exclusive EEO policy “would prevent the company from 
providing employee benefits to domestic partners;”237 
• The proposal would interfere with management’s ability to run the 
company on a day-to-day basis, and would thus be adverse to share-
holders’ interests;238 
• The proposal “is not in the best interests of the shareholders or the 
Company;”239 and 
• Anti-LGBT rights proposals are contrary to the core values of the 
company.240 
3. SEC Responses to LGBT-Exclusive Resolutions 
LGBT-exclusive resolutions have been far more susceptible than LGBT-
inclusive resolutions to modification by the SEC. I did not, however, find 
any LGBT-exclusive resolutions, since 2000, that the SEC permitted to be 
 
Implementing the proposal would adversely affect Ford’s ability to attract and retain talented 
employees.”). 
236 See, e.g., Bank of Am., supra note 233, at 45 (“[M]any state and local laws prohibit state 
and municipal governments from doing business with companies that discriminate on the basis of 
sexual orientation. Without an inclusive equal employment opportunity policy the Corporation 
would not be able to obtain contracts with these entities.”). 
237 See, e.g., Am. Express Co., supra note 101, at 19. 
238 See, e.g., id. (“The proposal is also unwise because it deals with employee matters that 
relate solely to the Company’s ordinary business operations. Certain tasks, such as constructing 
employment policies that are designed to attract and retain an effective workforce, are fundamental 
to management’s ability to run a company on a day to day basis and should not be assigned to 
shareholders to decide.”). 
239 E.g., Ford Motor Co., supra note 225, at 57. 
240 See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., supra note 223, at 78 (“Implementing the proposal and 
amending the Policy Statement would be contrary to the fact that [the Corporation] is committed 
to protecting its employees against discrimination and harassment of any nature, including 
discrimination and harassment based on sexual orientation. This would also conflict with the 
Corporation’s value of respecting each other and celebrating our diversity.”). 
  
972 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 929 
 
excluded in their entirety.241 Upon request by companies to exclude LGBT-
exclusive resolutions, the SEC has typically advised that only certain of the 
shareholder proponent’s arguments be deleted, recast as an opinion, or 
offered in conjunction with factual support in the form of citation to 
specific sources.242 The SEC generally advises shareholder proponents to 
delete arguments linking LGBT individuals to inflammatory stereotypes—
for example, pedophilia and a higher risk of contracting sexually transmitted 
diseases—from the resolution.243 The SEC also recommends that share-
holder proponents recast arguments discussing the opinions of employees, 
potential employees, shareholders, or customers as opinions or support 
them with facts, including citations.244 
The SEC’s extensive line-editing approach reflects its stance that em-
ployment-based proposals concerning nondiscrimination policies are 
generally includable in companies’ proxy materials, whether or not they are 
LGBT-inclusive or LGBT-exclusive. However, while social policy proposals 
inherently take a social or political position that is sometimes controversial, 
proxy materials must not become a platform for voicing inflammatory 
views. In lieu of excluding an LGBT-exclusive proposal containing inflam-
matory statements in its entirety, the SEC has extensively line-edited them 
under the rationale that such statements are “false and misleading” under 
Rule 14a-9.245 Whether a statement is considered too inflammatory to be 
included in a company’s proxy materials seems to be a value-based decision 
dependent on the individual SEC reviewer and contemporary social mores.  
The SEC has typically rebuffed company’s efforts to exclude LGBT-
exclusive resolutions in their entirety. Companies have proffered (and the SEC 
has rejected) Rules 14a-8(i)(3) (violation of proxy rules)246 and 14a-8(i)(7) 
(management functions)247 as grounds for excluding such proposals.  
 
241 See infra Table 12. 
242 Id. 
243 See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 122319, at *4 (Jan. 7, 2003) 
(permitting the company to exclude the proposal if the shareholder proponent does not delete the 
following clause: “Research proves promoting homosexual lifestyles such as those in the Compa-
ny’s diversity programs promote pedophilia.”). 
244 See, e.g., Boeing, SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 32063404, at *1, *5-6 (Feb. 13, 2002) 
(stating that the company may exclude the proposal if the shareholder proponent does not recast 
the following sentence as an opinion: “The Company’s diversity policy offends some current 
employees, and has contributed to eroding employee morale.”). 
245 See generally infra Table 12. 
246 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(3) (2013). 
247 Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(7). 
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Rule 14a-8(i)(3) permits a company to exclude shareholder proposals that 
violate “any of the Commission’s proxy rules, including [Rule] 240.14a-9,248 
which prohibits materially false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting 
materials.”249 Companies seeking to exclude LGBT-exclusive proposals on 
this basis have typically argued that the proposal is false and misleading in 
two ways: First, companies have argued unsuccessfully that characterizing 
an LGBT-exclusive EEO policy as “neutral” with respect to sexual orienta-
tion is misleading because the shareholder proponent is advancing argu-
ments that are laden with negative value judgments about LGBT 
individuals.250 Second, companies have argued, with mixed results, that 
certain portions of a proposal are false and misleading. While I have not 
found an instance where the SEC has allowed a company to exclude an 
LGBT-exclusive proposal in its entirety since 2000,251 it will often require 
shareholder proponents to modify language contained in their proposals, as 
demonstrated in Table 12 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
248 Id. § 240.14a-9. 
249 Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(3). 
250 See, e.g., Bank of Am. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 475447, at *5 (Feb. 22, 
2006) (rejecting the company’s argument to exclude an LGBT-exclusive proposal as false and 
misleading because “the confusing and conflicting portions of the supporting statement of the 
Proposal, combined with the seemingly neutral language of the proposed resolution, create an 
uncertainty as to the subject matter of the vote in the current instance”). 
251 See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co., supra note 243, at *1 (requiring the shareholder proponent to 
modify its proposal based on Rule 14a-8(i)(3), rather than exclude the proposal in its entirety). 
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Table 12: SEC Recommendations for LGBT-Exclusive Resolution  
Modifications to Permit Inclusion in Company’s Proxy Materials 
Date of SEC 
Letter Company Statement 
SEC Recommendation/ 
Rationale 
Feb. 28, 2001 AT&T Corp. 
“Whereas, some people are inclined to 
engage in sexual activity with members of 
the opposite sex, some people are inclined 
to engage in sexual activity with members 
of their own sex, some people are inclined 
to engage in sexual activity with members 
of both sexes, some people are inclined to 
engage in sexual activity with children, and 
some people are even inclined to engage in 
sexual activity with animals.” 
Delete (14a-9) 
Feb. 13, 2002 Boeing 
“The Company’s decision to adopt written 
policies which include sexual orientation in 
a diversity blueprint and to bar discrimina-
tion based upon sexual orientation in all 
employment practices, has contributed to 
eroding employee morale in the Company, 
and otherwise could adversely impact the 
Company’s business operations.” 
Recast as an opinion (14a-9) 
Feb. 13, 2002 Boeing 
“The Company’s diversity policy offends 
some current employees [and] has 
contributed to eroding employee morale.” 
Recast as an opinion (14a-9) 
Feb. 13, 2002 Boeing 
“Potential employees may also be deterred 
from seeking employment with the 
Company.” 
Recast as an opinion (14a-9) 
Feb. 13, 2002 Boeing 
“Some skilled employees have sought 
employment elsewhere because of these 
policies.” 
Delete (14a-9) 
Feb. 13, 2002 Boeing 
“The proposal would not preclude the 
Company from complying with the laws in 
specific jurisdictions which preclude 
discrimination based upon sexual 
orientation.” 
Delete (14a-9) 
Jan. 7, 2003 Coca-Cola 
“The Company has incorporated in its 
‘diversity’ program the promotion of 
alternative deviant sexual lifestyles into the 
company through promotion of the ‘Atlanta 
Pride,’ homosexual festival, and offering 
employee benefits to ‘domestic partners.’” 
Delete “promotion of 
alternative deviant sexual 
lifestyles into the company 
through promotion of the 
‘Atlanta Pride,’ homosexual 
festival, and” (14a-9) 
Jan. 7, 2003 Coca-Cola 
“Research proves promoting homosexual 
lifestyles such as those in the Company’s 
diversity programs promote pedophilia.” 
Delete (14a-9) 
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Jan. 7, 2003 Coca-Cola 
“Many oppose policies offering special 
rights based on ‘sexual orientation.’” 
Identify the “special rights” 
(14a-9) 
Jan. 7, 2003 Coca-Cola 
“The promotion of deviant sexual lifestyles 
through the support of homosexual rights 
rallies, diversity training, and rewarding 
homosexual partners with the benefits of 
spouses of the opposite sex of married 
employees, has contributed to eroding 
employee morale, which impacts the 
Company’s business operations, including a 
drop in stock prices and performance of the 
Company.” 
Provide factual support in 
the form of citation to a 
specific source (14a-9) 
Jan. 7, 2003 Coca-Cola 
“When put to a vote of citizens in 
government or shareholders in corporations, 
policies to reward deviant sexual behavior 
such as homosexuality have been rejected, 
most notable by Emerson Electric and 
Exxon Mobil.” 
Provide factual support in 
the form of citation to a 
specific source (14a-9) 
Jan. 7, 2003 Coca-Cola 
“Sexual orientation in the Company’s 
diversity and equal employment opportunity 
policies has popularity with a minority of 
the Company’s customers, employees and 
shareholders, but offends most because of 
their deeply held moral and religious 
beliefs.” 
Provide factual support in 
the form of citation to a 
specific source (14a-9) 
Jan. 7, 2003 Coca-Cola 
“The American Psychiatric Association 
declared homosexuality a psychiatric 
problem until homosexual rights activists 
changed it in 1973, and rewarding a 
psychiatric problem as a normal lifestyle 
will not help but rather harm the company.” 
Delete (14a-9) 
Jan. 7, 2003 Coca-Cola 
“As for pedophilia, the 1979 The Gay Report 
reported 73% of surveyed homosexuals 
admitted pedophilia.” 
Delete (14a-9) 
Jan. 7, 2003 Coca-Cola 
“The International Lesbian and Gay 
Association features pedophile groups, 
causing the United Nations to exclude it 
from the List of Non-Governmental 
Organisations.” 
Provide factual support in 
the form of a citation to a 
specific source (14a-9) 
Jan. 26, 2006 
Int’l Business 
Machines 
“Whereas: Thomas Jefferson said in A Bill 
for Establishing Religious Freedom, ‘To 
compel a man to furnish contributions of 
money for the propagation of opinions 
which he believes is sinful and tyrannical.’” 
Delete (14a-9) 
  
976 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 929 
 
Jan. 26, 2006 
Int’l Business 
Machines 
“Charitable contributions come from the 
fruit of our employee’s labor and belong to 
all shareholders as a group.” 
Delete (14a-9) 
Jan. 26, 2006 
Int’l Business 
Machines 
“While there are thousands of charitable 
organizations, some charitable groups focus 
on shared sexual interests, especially the 
sexual interests of homosexuals, bisexuals 
and those persons who feel the sexual 
identity they were born with does not 
comport with their preferred ‘gender 
expression’ or ‘gender identity.’ Individuals 
in this later group are sometimes referred to 
as transgendered.” 
Delete (14a-9) 
Jan. 26, 2006 
Int’l Business 
Machines 
“According to Karla Jay and Allen Young in 
their book, “The Gay Report (Summit 
Books, 1979),” 99% of homosexual males 
engage in oral sex, 91% engage in anal sex, 
82% engage in ‘rimming,’ 22% engage in 
‘fisting’ and 23% engage in ‘golden 
showers.’” 
Delete (14a-9) 
Jan. 26, 2006 
Int’l Business 
Machines 
“According to 1999 Medical Institute of 
Sexual Health report, ‘Homosexual men are 
at significantly increased risk of HIV/AIDS, 
hepatitis, anal cancer, gonorrhea, and 
gastrointestinal infections as a result of 
their sexual practices.’” 
Delete (14a-9) 
Jan. 26, 2006 
Int’l Business 
Machines 
“Whereas, those who engage in homosexual 
sex are at a significantly higher risk for 
HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted 
diseases.” 
Delete (14a-9) 
 
Table 13: Failed Arguments for Excluding LGBT-Exclusive Resolutions 
Date Company
Company’s Failed 
Argument
January 7, 2003 Coca-Cola 14a-8(i)(7), 14a-8(i)(3) 
January 26, 2006 Int’l Business Machines, Corp. 14a-8(i)(3)
February 22, 2006 Bank of America Corp. 14a-8(i)(3), 14a-8(i)(7) 
February 22, 2006 JP Morgan Chase & Co. 14a-8(i)(7)
February 23, 2006 Am. Express Co. 14a-8(i)(3), 14a-8(i)(7) 
March 6, 2006 Ford Motor Co. 14a-8(i)(7)
February 24, 2011 PG&E Corp. 14a-8(i)(6)
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CONCLUSION 
LGBT-inclusive proposals have been extraordinarily successful at effecting 
change. When analyzing only proposals that were brought to a shareholder 
vote, this Comment is in line with previous research that concludes that 
such proposals typically fail—in fact, only 5 out of the 69 LGBT-inclusive 
proposals brought to a vote from 2005 to 2012 received support from the 
majority of shareholders.252 LGBT-inclusive proposals received, on average, 
a not-insignificant 30.0% of the shareholder vote.253 Additionally, recent 
proxy seasons have yielded higher percentages of favorable votes, likely due 
to a multitude of factors, including increased adoption of inclusive policies 
among peer companies and changing social mores.254 However, compared to 
other social policy issues, employment-based shareholder proposals are less 
frequently brought to a vote and more frequently resolved in negotiations 
between shareholder proponents and companies. Accounting for the 
number of proposals that are withdrawn in exchange for company conces-
sions, the success rate is much higher. Fifty-nine percent of LGBT-inclusive 
proposals filed between 2005 and 2012 were immediately successful, resulting 
in an inclusive EEO policy.255 Of the 33 companies where LGBT-inclusive 
proposals initially failed, 21 ultimately adopted inclusive EEO policies—10 
of which were due to direct shareholder action, such as a shareholder vote or 
a withdrawn proposal.256 Although companies often resist including such 
proposals in their proxy materials,257 the SEC has generally rebuffed their 
requests to exclude such proposals258 and has insisted on minimal modifica-
tion of them, unlike their treatment of LGBT-exclusive proposals.259 
This Comment demonstrates that LGBT-inclusive proposals have been 
an important catalyst for change in corporate nondiscrimination policies. 
That such change does not result from a shareholder vote yielding majority 
support, or, in many cases, a shareholder vote at all, underscores the im-
portance of shareholder proposals in (1) bringing social issues to the atten-
tion of shareholders, management, and the public, and (2) facilitating 
dialogue among these groups—both of which result in tangible change. 
 
252 See supra Table 6. 
253 See supra Table 8. 
254 See supra Table 9. 
255 See supra Table 6. 
256 See supra Table 7. 
257 See supra subsection IV.A.2. 
258 See supra subsection IV.A.3. 
259 See supra subsection IV.B.3. 
